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Abstract
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are emerging as functional tech-
nology for providing a wide range of applications to vehicles and pas-
sengers. Ensuring secure functioning is one of the prerequisites for
deploying reliable VANETs. However, the open-medium nature of
these networks and the high-speed mobility of a large number of vehi-
cles harden the integration of primary security requirements such as
authentication, message integrity, non-repudiation, and privacy.
Without security, all users would be potentially vulnerable to the
misbehavior of the services provided by the VANET. Hence, it is nec-
essary to evict compromised, defective, and illegitimate nodes. The
basic solution envisioned to achieve these requirements is to use digital
certificates linked to a user by a trusted third party. These certificates
can then be used to sign information. Most of the existing solutions
manage these certificates by means of a central Certification Author-
ity (CA). According to IEEE 1609.2 standard, vehicular networks will
rely on the public key infrastructure (PKI). In PKI, a CA issues an au-
thentic digital certificate for each node in the network. Therefore, an
efficient certificate management is crucial for the robust and reliable
operation of any PKI. A critical part of any certificate-management
scheme is the revocation of certificates. The distribution of certificate
status information process, as well as the revocation process itself, is
an open research problem for VANETs.
In this thesis, firstly we analyze the revocation process itself and de-
velop an accurate and rigorous model for certificate revocation. One
of the key findings of our analysis is that the certificate revocation
process is statistically self-similar. As none of the currently common
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formal models for revocation is able to capture the self-similar na-
ture of real revocation data, we develop an autoregressive Fractional-
integrated moving average (ARFIMA) model that recreates this pat-
tern. Neglecting the self-similarity of the revocation process leads
to inefficient revocation release strategies. With synthetic revocation
traces, current revocation schemes can be improved by defining more
accurate revocation data issuance policies. We show that traditional
mechanisms that aim to scale could benefit from these traces to im-
prove their updating strategies.
Secondly, we analyze how to deploy a certificate status checking ser-
vice for mobile networks and we propose a new criterion based on
a risk metric to evaluate cached status data. With this metric, the
PKI is able to code information about the revocation process in the
standard certificate revocation lists. Thus, users can evaluate a risk
function in order to estimate whether a certificate has been revoked
while there is no connection to a status checking server. Moreover,
we also propose a systematic methodology to build a fuzzy system
that assists users in the decision making process related to certificate
status checking.
Thirdly, we propose two novel mechanisms for distributing and vali-
dating certificate status information (CSI) in VANET. This first mech-
anism is a collaborative certificate status checking mechanism based
on the use based on an extended-CRL. The main advantage of this
extended-CRL is that the road-side units and repository vehicles can
build an efficient structure based on an authenticated hash tree to
respond to status checking requests inside the VANET, saving time
and bandwidth. The second mechanism aims to optimize the trade-
off between the bandwidth necessary to download the CSI and the
freshness of the CSI. This mechanism is based on the use of a hybrid
delta-CRL scheme and Merkle hash trees, so that the risk of operating
with unknown revoked certificates remains below a threshold during
the validity interval of the base-CRL, and CAs have the ability to
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manage this risk by setting the size of the delta-CRLs. For each
of these mechanism, we conduct security analysis and performance
evaluation to demonstrate the reliable security and efficiency of the
proposed schemes.
Finally, we also analyze the impact of the revocation service in the cer-
tificate prices. We model the behavior of the oligopoly of risk-averse
certificate providers that issue digital certificates to clients facing iden-
tical independent risks. We found the equilibrium in the Bertrand
game. In this equilibrium, we proof that certificate providers that
offer better revocation information are able to impose higher prices to
their certificates without sacrificing market share in favor of the other
oligarchs.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Today’s transportation systems face serious challenges in terms of road safety,
efficiency and environmental friendliness. With a huge improvement in tech-
nological innovations, Vehicular Communication (VC) emerges as a solution to
palliate many issues of our modern day communication system in roads. This
type of communication involves the use of short-range radios in each vehicle.
This technology allows various vehicles to communicate with each other which
is also known as (V2V) communication and with road side infrastructure (V2I)
communication. Vehicular communication systems (VCS) are a direct response
to the increasing demands of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) services
and the expectations of the automotive industry. In this sense, vehicular com-
munication is designed for a wide range of applications related to safety, traffic
management, and passenger comfort.
Safety applications are the main motivation for the development of these sys-
tems. They are conceived to spread accurate data quickly and reliably, in order
to avoid accidents and life losses. In this sense, vehicles collaborate to avoid
accidents, e.g., they disseminate emergency warning messages when a hazardous
status is detected, such as slippery road conditions. In the same way, VCSs im-
prove road safety by enabling traffic lights and signs to communicate with vehi-
cles. In addition to these safety applications, VCSs are also employed in a variety
of ITS traffic management applications. Road traffic management applications
focus on optimizing traffic flow in order to avoid traffic congestion, to reduce
travel time, and to use the transportation infrastructure effectively. A third type
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of applications relates to the comfort and well-being of passengers, named info-
tainment applications. Infotainment applications provide additional information
or entertainment to the passengers and/or driver, e.g. multimedia services, ra-
dio channels, Internet connection or advertises from some local merchants or gas
stations.
Vehicular networks have attracted the attention of both academic and indus-
trial communities, which is reflected in the interest of governments and standard-
ization organizations. For example, European car manufacturers have instituted
the Car-to-Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) [2] to improve road safety
and efficiency, and the U.S FCC (Federal Communication Commission) has ap-
proved a 75 MHz spectrum for vehicular networks [3]. The Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) also supports vehicular communication with
the IEEE 1609 family of standards for wireless access in vehicular environments
(WAVE) [4]. Previous works present approaches that employ various technologies
for the implementation of VCS. In this way, several car manufacturers support
their vehicles through Internet access via cellular networks. However, using cel-
lular networks is not the best way to build a VCS in terms of cost and latency.
In many proposals, standard IEEE 802.11 is deployed for a VCS. However, this
protocol has a limited radio range and needs numerous base stations to maintain
the vehicles connected to the infrastructure. Using Vehicular Ad Hoc Network
(VANET) with On-Board Units (OBUs) and Roadside Units (RSUs) appears to
be the more effective method, but it also entails significant challenges. VANETs
also enable multi-hop routing through vehicles to reach the infrastructure. Nev-
ertheless, without securing these networks, damage to property and life can be
done at a greater extent.
Simple and effective security mechanisms are the major problem of deploying
VANET in public. Without security, a VANET is wide open to a number of
attacks such as propagation of false warning messages as well as suppression of
actual warning messages, thereby causing accidents. This makes security a factor
of major concern in building such networks.
2
1.1 Research Motivation
1.1 Research Motivation
VANETs deployment will not occur without assuring secure communications.
As a special case of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), VANETs inherit all of
MANETs security concerns while introducing additional security challenges spe-
cific to their characteristics. In VANETs, attackers could forge, inject, replay and
drop messages in order to violate user privacy, information integrity, authenticity,
and system performance.
In order to secure a VANET, the following security requirements should be
met [5]:
• Authentication: Entity authentication is required to ensure that the com-
municating entities are legitimate. In addition, data authentication is also
a concern to ensure that the contents of the received data is neither altered
nor replayed.
• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is necessary to prevent legitimate users
from denying the transmission or contents of their messages.
• Privacy : Preserving users’ privacy is necessary to prevent the disclosure of
their location information and real identities.
• Access control : Access control is required to delimitate the operations that
any entity in the network is allowed to perform. Moreover, any misbehav-
ing entity should be removed from the network to protect other legitimate
entities. In addition, any action taken by those misbehaving entities should
be repealed.
• Availability : Users may be frustrated if VANET services become temporar-
ily unavailable due to attacks such as DoS attacks.
Without security, all users would be potentially vulnerable to the misbehavior
of the services provided by the VANET. Hence, it is necessary to evict compro-
mised, defective, and illegitimate nodes. The basic solution envisioned to achieve
these requirements is to use digital certificates linked to a user by a trusted third
party. These certificates can then be used to sign information. Most of the
3
1.2 Objective of the Thesis
existing solutions manage these certificates by means of a central Certification
Authority (CA) [6, 7]. According to IEEE 1609.2 standard [8], vehicular networks
will rely on the public key infrastructure (PKI). In PKI, a CA issues an authentic
digital certificate for each node in the network. Therefore, an efficient certificate
management is crucial for the robust and reliable operation of any PKI. A critical
part of any certificate-management scheme is the revocation of certificates.
To revoke a vehicle in PKI, a certificate revocation list (CRL) has to be
issued by the trusted authority (i.e., centralized revocation) and broadcast by
the infrastructure RSUs. The centralized certificate status checking process in the
classical PKI may be impractical in the large scale VANETs due to the following
reasons: (1) Each CA encounters a large number of CRL requests which can
render the CA a bottle-neck; (2) The CRL downloading process is long relative to
the short V2I communication duration between the immobile RSUs and the highly
mobile OBUs during which the new CRL should be delivered to the requesting
OBU. This long delay is due to the fact that a request submitted by an OBU to an
RSU must be forwarded to the CA, and CA has to send the new CRL to that RSU
which in turn forwards the new CRL to the requesting OBU. Accordingly, the
classical PKI should be optimized to satisfy the revocation service requirement
in vehicular communication scenarios. To provide a practical revocation service
for VANETs, it is required for each OBU to efficiently check the status of any
certificate in a timely manner.
Additionally, while wired networks can guarantee on demand connectivity be-
tween the CA and principals in the wired network for obtaining the current cer-
tificate status information, VANETS cannot guarantee such on demand contact
at all times due to the sporadic connectivity. Such on demand connectivity with
the centralized entity is essential for recipients to have confidence on the security
infrastructure. Hence, the risk on trusting outdated certificate status information
while being disconnected from the infrastructure needs to be quantified.
1.2 Objective of the Thesis
This thesis aims to mitigate the issues of conveying certificate status information
over vehicular networks. Therefore, the objectives of this thesis are as follows:
4
1.2 Objective of the Thesis
1. Modeling the revocation process to perform analytic and empirical evalu-
ations. This modeling should allow users and authorities to predict when
a revocation is prone to occur. Moreover, the resulting model should also
serve as evaluation tool to generate synthetic revocations.
2. Evaluating the performance of current certificate status mechanisms in ve-
hicular networks. This involves analyzing the impacts of sporadic connec-
tivity with the security infrastructure on the security performance of the
proposed security mechanisms.
3. Proposing a metric to quantify the risk of operating while being discon-
nected from the infrastructure. This metric should take into account all
the information about the revocation process available to the certification
authority.
4. Designing a new certificate status validation mechanism for vehicular net-
works. This mechanism should take into account the knowledge derived
from the revocation process modeling, and use the criterion to measure the
risk of operating while disconnected from the infrastructure.
5
1.2 Objective of the Thesis
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Chapter 2
Results
This section summarizes the main contributions of this thesis aligned with the
objectives detailed in the previous section. Throughout the research process that
involves the development of the thesis, several results have been obtained. These
results have been validated by the international scientific community through
the assessment of papers published in high-ranked journals and international
conferences. Each contribution is briefly described in the following sections and
appended at the end of this document.
2.1 Analysis and modeling of the revocation pro-
cess
Most of the effort on analyzing certificate revocation has been mainly put on
studying the trade-offs that can be achieved when dealing with different revoca-
tion mechanisms [9, 10, 11, 12]. These studies aim to compare the performance of
different revocation mechanisms in different scenarios. Recently however, there
have appeared some studies like [13, 14, 15] that can be considered a first step
towards understanding the revocation process itself. These studies have mainly
analyzed the probability distribution of certificate revocation requests. However,
these later studies do not capture the time evolution of the revocation process or
provide a means to efficiently forecast revocation events.
7
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A revocation method is selected by an organization based on the cost, infras-
tructure, and volumes of transactions that are expected. To gauge these costs,
different revocation mechanisms are tested under the assumption that the revoca-
tion events follow a specific probability distribution. Most theoretical frameworks
and simulation studies for performance evaluation assume that the temporal dis-
tribution of queries follows a Poisson distribution and using this, organizations
can estimate the infrastructure needed to deploy the PKI and the associated
costs. However, in this thesis, we have demonstrated that revocation data is sta-
tistically self-similar, that none of the commonly used revocation models is able
to capture this fractal behavior, and that such behavior has serious implications
for the design, control, and analysis of revocation mechanisms such as CRLs.
We started by analyzing the validity of Poisson-like process assumption. We
used publicly available CRLs from different certification authorities (containing
more than 300,000 revoked certificates over a period of three years (see Table 2.1)).
Our analysis demonstrated that the Poisson distribution fails to capture the sta-
tistical properties of the actual revocation process. We also saw that the Poisson
distribution grossly under-estimates the bandwidth utilization of the revocation
mechanism. At first glance, this might look like an obvious result, since after all
as a memoryless process, Poisson distribution cannot be expected to model peri-
odic trends like daily, weekly and monthly cycles in revocation rates. We showed
however that the modeling inability transcends simple cycles. In particular, we
showed self-similarity has a severe detrimental impact on the revocation service
performance.
Issuer Name Number of Revoked Certificates Last Update Next Update
GoDaddy 932,900 2012/02/01 2012/02/03
VeriSign 5,346 2012/02/02 2012/02/16
Comodo 2,727 2012/02/03 2012/02/06
GlobalSign 7,591 2012/02/02 2012/03/03
Thawte 8,061 2012/02/01 2012/02/16
Table 2.1: Description of the collected CRLs.
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Results of our analysis, including burstiness at all scales, strongly indicate
self-similar nature of revocation events. In Figure 2.1 we can observe different
evident trends; (i) Burstiness in all time scales: the burstiness of the revocation
process does not disappear when changing the time scales. (ii) Lack of natural
length of bursts: The figure shows burstiness ranging from days to months. Note
that the full duration of the figure with the largest time slot is 1,000 days, and
some of the bursts have many hours of duration.
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Figure 2.1: Revocation Bursts over Four Orders of Magnitude.
We confirmed this by analyzing the autocorrelation of the revocation process
and estimating the Hurst parameter for the observed distribution and showing
that the estimates validate self-similar nature of the revocation lists. First of
all, we started analyzing the autocorrelation of the revocation data. Recall that
in a self-similar process autocorrelations decay hyperbolically rather than expo-
nentially fast, implying a nonsummable autocorrelation function
∑
k r(k) = ∞
(long-range dependence or LRD). For the frame data, the empirical autocorrela-
tion functions r(k) are shown in Fig. 2.2, with lag k ranging from 0 to 100. Notice
9
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that r(k) decreases slower than exponentially no matter the CA. The curve does
decay toward zero, but it does so extremely slowly. The very slowly decaying
autocorrelations are indicative of LRD.
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Figure 2.2: Autocorrelation function of the revocation process per CA.
Then, we used five different methods for assessing self-similarity: the variance-
time plot, the rescaled range (or R/S) plot, the periodogram plot, the Detrended
Fluctuation Analysis (DFA) plot and the Whittle estimator. We concentrated
on individual months from our revocation time series, so as to provide as nearly
a stationary dataset as possible. To provide an example of these approaches,
analysis of a single month from GoDaddy revocation data is shown in Figure 2.3.
The figure shows plots for the four graphical methods: variance-time (upper left),
rescaled range (upper right), periodogram (lower left) and DFA (lower right). The
variance-time plot is linear and shows a slope that is distinctly different from -1
(which is shown for comparison); the slope is estimated using regression as -0.077,
yielding an estimate for H of 0.96. The R/S plot shows an asymptotic slope
that is different from 0.5 and from 1.0 (shown for comparison); it is estimated
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using regression as 0.95, which is also the corresponding estimate of H. The
periodogram plot shows a slope of -0.14 (the regression line is shown), yielding
an estimate of H as 0.83. Finally, the Whittle estimator for this revocation data
(not a graphical method) yields an estimated Hurst value of 0,923 with a 95%
confidence interval of (0.87, 0.95).
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Figure 2.3: Graphical methods for checking for self-similarity of the revocation
process from GoDaddy (a) variance-time plot, (b) pox plot of R/S, (c) peri-
odogram plot, and (d) DFA plot.
Beyond invalidating Poisson-like distributions, this proof of self-similarity has
important implications on CA utilization, throughput, and certificate stratus
checking time. Intuitively, as the revocation process is bursty (non-uniformly
11
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distributed) the CA will be partially idle during low burst periods and vice versa.
Thus, the revocation lists will grow non-uniformly, and current updating policies
will result bandwidth inefficient.
After proving the selfsimilar nature of the revocation process, we went a step
further by developing an accurate and rigorous model for certificate revocation
process. The proposed model is based on an autoregressive fractionally inte-
grated moving average (ARFIMA) process [16], which provides an accurate and
parsimonious model for revocation.
w(n) s(n)x(n) y(n)
B(z) A-1(z) C(z)
Figure 2.4: Components of an ARFIMA process.
Figure 2.4 shows a scheme of the ARFIMA model, where the components of
each bloc are:
A(z) = 1− 0.6467z−1 + 0.02693z−2 + 0.09085z−3 + 0.09753z−4 + 0.1218z−5 + 0.1991z−6
− 0.804z−7 + 0.6906z−8 + 0.03223z−9 − 0.04807z−10 − 0.007471z−11 − 0.0759z−12
− 0.08934z−13 − 0.07605z−14 − 0.006487z−15 − 0.02565z−16 − 0.01994z−17 − 0.04003z−18
− 0.05007z−19 − 0.01331z−20 − 0.07361z−21 − 0.001947z−22 − 0.02836z−23 − 0.01824z−24
− 0.03693z−25 + 0.007019z−26 − 0.07691z−27 − 0.01872z−28 − 0.03821z−29, (2.1)
B(z) = 1− 0.6454z−1 + 0.005554z−2 + 0.1113z−3 + 0.1317z−4 + 0.1032z−5 + 0.2802z−6
− 0.6652z−7 + 0.6688z−8, (2.2)
C(z) = (1− z−1)−0.3. (2.3)
Once we obtained the model, we described how to use it to build a synthetic
revocation generator that can be used in simulations of resource assessment. To be
able to construct the revocation trace generator, we needed to concatenate a zero-
memory non-linear function (ZMNL) to the ARFIMA model Figure 2.5 shows the
block diagram of the synthetic revocation generator, where the ZMNL function is
placed at the output of the ARFIMA filter. The values of the white noise sequence
w(n) at the input of the ARFIMA filter are chosen such that V ar(w(n)) = 1 and
E[w(n)] = 0. In turn, the output of the ARFIMA filter s(n) becomes the input
12
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of the ZMNL function. In this way, the ARFIMA model transforms the N(0, 1)
sequence in a colored N(0, σ2s) sequence. Then, the ZMNL function transforms
the colored N(0, σ2s) sequence in an Exponential(µr) sequence, where µr is the
measured average of daily revoked certificates.
ARFIMA ZNML
(·)
( )n ( )s n
,r r 
Synthetic
Revocations
( )
Figure 2.5: Synthetic Revocation trace generator.
Hence our model produces synthetic revocation traces that are indistinguish-
able for practical purposes from those corresponding to actual revocations.
2.2 PKI deployment in vehicular adhoc networks
Our previous results showed that when deploying revocation mechanisms the
characteristics of the revocation process have to be taken into account. In the
case of the vehicular networks, the IEEE 1609.2 standard [8] states that they
will rely on the use of CRLs. In particular, OBUs must obtain the Certificate
Status Information (CSI) from the revocation system. In the literature there
are several mechanisms to distribute CSI in environments prone to disruptions
[10, 17, 18, 19] though none of them takes into account the revocation process
characteristics in its design. They are essentially based on retrieving the CSI from
the infrastructure during connectivity intervals and using some caching strategy
when the connection to the infrastructure is not possible. Then, OBUs may
use their cached copy of the CSI (previously downloaded during a connectivity
interval) or may try to discover more recent CSI among their neighbors. Once
a copy of the CSI is obtained, OBUs have to face the problem of evaluating the
freshness of this copy. Depending on the freshness of the CSI, the risk of trusting
this information as comprehensive will vary. OBUs should be able to quantify
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this risk to make an informed decision whether to operate or not with a specific
certificate.
CRLs are expected to be quite large because the network scale of VANETs is
expected to be very large and because to protect the privacy of users each vehicle
is going to have many temporary certificates (or pseudonyms). Hence, the distri-
bution of CRLs is prone to long delays. Moreover, during the early deployment
of VANETs, RSUs may not be uniformly distributed in the network. There-
fore, the way of distributing CRLs must be designed to ensure that revocation
is can be correctly deployed in those delay-tolerant environments. There have
been proposed several ways to improve the distribution of CRLs (e.g. [7, 19]).
These proposals intended to make more efficient the distribution of the CRLs,
by for example, reducing its size or using V2V communications. However, none
of these proposals deals with the problem of the lack of information about cer-
tificates that are revoked during the validity interval of a CRL. In this thesis,
we presented a metric that quantifies the risk that the recipients are facing when
accepting messages signed with certificates that are not present in the CRLs at
the OBU.
Using group theory and a probabilistic analysis, we calculated the probability
of considering a certificate as a valid one when the real status known by the CA
is revoked at time t as (see details in [20]):
ρ(t) = Prob(Cert ∈ U) = p(t− t0)
(1− p)Tc + p(t− t0) , (2.4)
where Tc is the mean certificate lifetime, p is the percentage of revoked cer-
tificates and U is the set of revoked certificates that were not included in the
previous CRL.
Figure 2.6 shows the theoretical evolution of ρ(t) during three consecutive
CRL updates. As expected, the probability is zero at instants of CRL update as
there are no unknown revoked certificates. On the contrary, this probability is
maximum just before publicizing a new CRL, as the number of unknown revoked
certificates is maximum at this point. Note that this maximum (as well as the
slope of the probability function) varies depending of the percentage of revoked
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certificates (pi). Thus, when this percentage is higher (note that p2 > p3 > p1)
the probability increases more rapidly.
0 CRL Update CRL Update CRL Update0
p1
p3
p2
 
 
Prob(Cert ∈ U )
Figure 2.6: Time evolution of the probability of considering an unknown revoked
certificate as valid.
Once we obtained the probability of operating with an unknown revoked cer-
tificates, we developed a new risk analysis method to identify and assess this
risk. In addition, we must assure that risk information produced is processed and
reliably applied to decision making. Previous works in the literature [21, 22, 23]
acknowledged the existence of an operational risk when using a revocation mecha-
nism such as CRLs. However, these works neither quantified this risk nor provided
a means to deal with it. We modeled and characterized a risk-based decision mak-
ing system based on fuzzy logic. To that end, taking into account the information
that users can obtain from the CRLs, we design a fuzzy inference system that
gives as output the risk of operating with a particular CRL. Using the proposed
model, users get an idea of how risky is to operate with their current CRL and
are able to make risk-based decisions.
Risk analysis by the trusting user in its potential interaction with a probable
illegitimate user was done by:
1. Determining the possibility of operating with users that have their certifi-
cate revoked using ρ(t);
2. Determining the possible consequences of operating with an illegitimate
user, using the certificate revocation causes (see Table 2.2).
Then, we defined a fuzzy-risk based decision making system where the inputs
of the inference system were:
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Numerical Code Revocation Code wi Description
(1) keyCompromise 9 Private key has been compro-
mised.
(2) cACompromise 10 Certificate authority has been
compromised.
(3) affiliationChanged 1 Subject’s name or other infor-
mation has changed.
(4) superseded 0 Certificate has been super-
seded.
(5) cessationOfOperation 1 Certificate is no longer needed.
(6) certificateHold 3 Certificate has been put on
hold.
(7) removeFromCRL 0 Certificate was previously on
hold and should be removed
from the CRL.
(8) privilegeWithdrawn 5 Privileges granted to the sub-
ject of the certificate have been
withdrawn.
(9) aACompromise 10 Attribute authority has been
compromised.
Table 2.2: Revocation codes, weight values wi and description.
1. Number of revoked certificates (NumRev): as users have cached CRLs
which include the list of revoked certificates and their revoked date, users
can know the number of revoked certificates per day;
2. Revocation categories (RevCat): CRLs can also include the revocation
cause of each certificate;
3. Age of the CRL (CRLage): using also the information contained in the
CRL; users can calculate the time elapsed since the issuance of the CRL.
For each of these inputs we defined a membership function (see Fig. 2.7).
Finally, a case study on risk analysis of a CRL issued by an actual CA was
used to show the validity of the proposed model. The results of the risk as-
sessment in the case study were represented as risk score, located in a defined
range, and risk category with linguistic words, which indicates that by using the
proposed methodology the risk associated with CRLs can be assessed effectively
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Figure 2.7: Membership functions.
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Figure 2.8: Risk Indicator as a combination of a) the CRL age and the number of
revoked certificates, b) the revocation cause categories and the number of revoked
certificates, c) the CRL age and the revocation cause categories.
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and efficiently. These results showed that although this CA is issuing CRLs with
a frequency of 1 day, there is still some inherent risk that our model achieves
to measure (see Fig. 2.8). Based on this metric, any user that operates using
certificates from this CA could make informed decisions.
2.3 Certificate Status Checking mechanism for
VANETs
At this point of the thesis, we were aware that current revocation mechanisms
will exhibit some issues when directly applied to a vehicular network, and they
need to be improved in terms of efficiency and CSI freshness. First of all, we
analyzed the drawbacks of applying the IEEE 1609.2 standard proposal which
suggests the use of CRLs.
As mentioned before, for a CA to invalidate a vehicle’s certificates, the CA
includes the certificate serial number in the CRL. The CA then distributes the
CRL so that vehicles can identify and distrust the newly revoked vehicle. The
distribution should spread quickly to every vehicle in the system. However, the
distribution itself poses a great challenge due to the size of the CRL. As a CRL is
a list containing the serial numbers of all certificates issued by a given certification
authority that have been revoked and have not yet expired, its distribution causes
network overhead. Moreover, the CRL size increases dramatically even if only a
small portion of the OBUs in the VANET is revoked. To have an idea of how
big the CRL size can be, consider the case where 1% of the total number of the
OBUs in the United States is revoked. Recall that in a VANET, each vehicle
owes not only an identity certificate, but also several pseudonyms. The number
of pseudonyms may vary depending on the degree of privacy and anonymity that
it must be guaranteed. According to [24], OBUs must store enough pseudonyms
to change pseudonyms about every minute while driving. This equates to about
43,800 pseudonyms per year for an average of two hours of driving per day. In
the US, 255,917,664 ”highway” registered vehicles were counted in 2008, of which
137,079,843 passenger cars [25]. In this case, the CRL would contain around 100
billion revoked certificates. Assuming that certificates can be identified by a 16
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byte fingerprint (the size of one AES block), the CRL size is around 1,7 TB.
Only the amount of memory necessary to storage this CRL makes it impossible
its deployment.
The CRL size can be reduced by using regional CAs. However, there appears
a trade-off between the size of the CA region and size of the CRL, as well as
the management complexity of the entire PKI system for VANETs. The least
complicated region to manage would be a single large area, such as the entire
United States, with a single CA responsible for every certificate and pseudonym.
However, this gives place to CRLs of several terabytes. Hence, it is necessary
to divide the CRL information according to regional areas. In this sense, if
we divide the entire United States by cities (i.e. ∼10,016 cities), the CRL size
is reduced to around 170 Mbytes. Using the 802.11a protocol to communicate
with RSUs in range, vehicles could have between 10-30 Mbps depending on the
vehicle’s speed and the road congestion [26]. Thus, in the best case (under non-
congested conditions) a vehicle will need more than 45 seconds to download the
whole CRL. In scenarios where vehicles are not able to keep a permanent link
with the infrastructure for this amount of time, techniques such as Bloom filter or
Digital Fountain Codes could be used to download the CRL. Therefore, though
the problem of having a huge CRL is mitigated by the use of such techniques,
the restraints imposed by the distribution affect the freshness of the revocation
data.
A direct consequence of this significant time to download a CRL is that a new
CRL cannot be issued very often, so its validity period has to be shortened. This
validity period directly determines how often a vehicle has to update the revoca-
tion data. Therefore, the validity period of the CRL is critical to the bandwidth
consumption. Moreover, it appears another trade-off between the freshness of
revocation data and the bandwidth consumed by downloading CRLs. Large va-
lidity periods will decrease the network overhead at expenses of having outdated
revocation data. Small validity periods will increase the network overhead but
users will have fresh information about revoked certificates. As CRLs cannot be
issued every time there is a new revoked certificate, vehicles will be operating
with revocation data that are not comprehensive. In this thesis we developed a
revocation mechanism to improve the performance of the revocation process in a
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vehicular network by taking advantage of authenticated data structures and V2V
communications.
Certification 
Authority 
(CA)
RSU
RSU
Roadside 
Unit (RSU)
On-Board 
Unit (OBU)
Figure 2.9: System Architecture.
Our proposal was called COACH (COllaborative certificate stAtus CHecking).
COACH is an application-layer mechanism for distributing revocation data. The
system architecture is an adaptation of a PKI system to the vehicular environment
(see Fig. 2.9). The main idea behind COACH is to embed some little extra
information into the CRL such that allows us to create an efficient and secure
request/response protocol. For those nodes that just need to obtain status data of
some certificates, our protocol avoids downloading a complete CRL. Specifically,
we proposed a way of efficiently embedding a Merkle hash tree (MHT) [27] within
the structure of the standard CRL to generate a so-called extended-CRL.
To create the extended-CRL, we used an extension, which is a standard way
of adding extra information to the CRL. Our extension contains all the necessary
information to allow any vehicle or VANET infrastructure element that possesses
the extended-CRL to build the COACH tree, i.e., a hash tree with the CSI of
the CRL. Using this COACH tree, any entity possessing the extended-CRL can
act as repository and efficiently answer to certificate status checking requests
of other vehicles or VANET elements (see Fig. 2.10). COACH responses are
short since in general, their size is less than 1 Kbyte (see Table 2.3, where Thash
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Figure 2.10: COACH bootstrapping.
and Tmul denote the time required to perform a pairing operation and a point
multiplication, respectively). This allows a COACH response to perfectly fit
within a single UDP message. We also proposed an enhancement of our basic
mechanism called EvCOACH (Evergreen-COACH) to improve the performance
of COACH in scenarios with relatively few revocations per CRL validity period.
Mechanism Request size Response size Verification delay Signing delay
CRL 73 bytes 145 Mbytes 4Tmul Tmul
COACH 73 bytes 710 bytes k(Thash(log2N + 1) + 4Tmul) Tmul
EvCOACH 73 bytes 725 bytes k(Thash(log2N + i+ 2) + 4Tmul) Tmul
ADOPT 66 bytes 586 bytes k(4Tmul) k(Tmul)
Table 2.3: COACH vs other certificate validation mechanisms
Not that ADOPT [10] (Ad-hoc Distributed OCSP for Trust) provides a re-
vocation service based on the Online Status Checking Protocol (OCSP)[? ] in a
decentralized manner. ADOPT uses cached OCSP responses that are distributed
and stored on intermediate nodes in the VANET. Thus, ADOPT’s query cost is
the lowest but not far from COACH. Moreover, we also showed by simulation,
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that COACH makes the distribution of CSI more efficient than distributing com-
plete CRLs (even though they are compressed), reducing the data that have to
be transmitted over the VANET.
Vehicle Speed
Delay
COACH CRL ADOPT
Tx Comp. RTT Tx Comp. RTT Tx Comp. RTT
20 m/s 75 ms 2,401 ms 78 ms 3,521 h 2,400 ms 3,521 h 72 ms 3,612 ms 101 ms
30 m/s 149 ms 2,401 ms 157 ms 8,213 h 2,400 ms 8,214 h 122 ms 3,600 ms 312ms
40 m/s 173 ms 2,401 ms 187 ms 9,811 h 2,400 ms 9,813 h 152 ms 3,600 ms 421ms
Table 2.4: Delays when querying for CSI.
Table 2.4 shows the mean delays incurred when querying for the status of a
given certificate. With transmission delay we denote the time to send the CSI
query and the corresponding response. If we compare the transmission delay of
the different revocation mechanisms, we can observe that ADOPT is the fastest
but not so far from COACH. On the other hand, by computational delay we denote
the time required to compose and validate a CSI response. In this case, ADOPT
has the worst computational delay because each CSI response has to be signed
by the CA. CRL computational delay is minimal as the CRL is only signed once
and to searching the serial number of a certificate in the list has a computational
cost of O(log2N). COACH only requires one CA signature but a Path has to
be computed each time a CSI response is required, so the computational cost
is similar to the CRL. Finally, we define Round-Trip Time (RTT) as the time
that takes since a vehicle requests for CSI until the status of a given certificate is
validated. Therefore, the RTT is affected by the transmission, computational and
propagation delays. ADOPT has the worst RTT due to the multihop transmission
of the cached CSI, while CRL and COACH download the CSI directly from the
repository in range. In any case, the vehicles’ speed affects transmission and RTT
delays in all three revocation mechanisms. We must stress that a node possessing
an extended-CRL can act as COACH repository but that a COACH repository is
not a TTP. In other words, COACH is cryptographically oﬄine, which means that
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no online trusted entity (like a CA) is needed for authenticating the responses
produced by COACH repositories.
Though COACH improves the efficiency of the revocation mechanism, it does
not enhance the freshness of the revocation data. To that end, we designed
BECSI, a Bandwidth Efficient Certificate Status Information distribution mech-
anism for VANETs. BECSI improves the distribution of CSI by transmitting
the revocation information that is unknown to a particular user during the valid-
ity period of the cached CSI. The main idea behind BECSI is to allow vehicles
requesting for new CSI during the validity period of the current CRL. Thus, revo-
cations that occur during the validity period of the CRL will not be unknown to
the vehicles during this whole validity period, reducing the risk of operating with
an unknown revoked certificate. We addressed the CRL distribution problem by
exploiting the combination of three well-known mechanisms: (1) delta-CRL [28],
(2) Merkle hash tree (MHT) [27], and (3) one-way hash chain [29]. By com-
bining these three mechanisms, we designed BECSI which allows increasing the
availability and freshness of the certificate status information and at the same
time reduces the bandwidth necessary to check the validity of a given certificate.
BECSI takes advantage of V2V communication to create mobile repositories so
that vehicles do not have to rely solely in the RSUs to obtain CSI. Therefore,
BECSI reduces the peak bandwidth load associated with the CSI requests as there
are more entities in the network that can answer these requests. To achieve, we
combine the issuance of delta-CRLs and MHT.
By using the underlying concept of delta-CRLs, we implemented a more ef-
ficient way of distributing CSI inside the VANET. To help minimize frequent
downloads of lengthy CRLs, delta-CRLs are published aperiodically. On the
other hand, BECSI codes the information included in the CRL and delta-CRLs
in different MHTs. As in COACH using this tree, any entity possessing the
extended-CRL can act as repository and efficiently answer to certificate status
checking requests of other vehicles. To evaluate the performance of BECSI we
define three different metrics:
• Query Cost (Qcost): This cost represents bandwidth requirement from repos-
itories to vehicles. As it is shown in Fig. 2.11 while the CRL size grows
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linearly with the number of revoked certificates, BECSI response sizes de-
scribe a logarithmic growth. Therefore, in terms of Query Cost, BECSI is
more efficient than CRL and the compressed CRL and similar to ADOPT.
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Figure 2.11: Response size vs. number of vehicles.
• Request Ratio: This metric captures the amount of requests that the entities
perform to update the CSI. Figure 2.12 shows that BECSI and ADOPT
have an almost constant request rate. Traditional schemes like CRL have
lower request rates as there is only one request per validity period.
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Figure 2.12: Request rate for different revocation mechanisms.
• Window of vulnerability (WOV): This criterion captures the risk of operat-
ing with cached CSI. Figure 2.13 shows that CRL is the worst mechanism
in terms of WOV. BECSI inherits the improvement in terms of WOV from
the delta-CRL mechanism. Thus, BECSI highly improves traditional CRL
in terms of WOV.
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Figure 2.13: WOV for different revocation mechanisms.
Using the NCTUns [30] simulator we analyzed the performance of BECSI in
a vehicular scenario. In VANETs, the most important issue in any revocation
method is the delay of delivering the CSI to the vehicles to prevent that misbe-
having vehicles from jeopardizing the safety of its neighbors. Consequently, we
measured the revocation delay as delay from the moment a vehicle issues a CSI
request until the moment the new CSI is received. Table 2.5 shows the average
time spent by a vehicle to retrieve CSI from a repository.
Revocation Mechanism Average Time Standard Deviation
CRL (300 KB) 2,23 min 0,51 min
Compressed-CRL (20 KB) 7,01 sec 1,12 sec
Traditional Delta CRL (2.5-15
KB)
4,47 sec 2,12 sec
ADOPT (652 B) 705,06 ms 200,81 ms
BECSI Delta CRL (8 KB) 6,02 sec 0,05 sec
BECSI MHT (778 B-912 B) 483,02 ms 20,31 ms
Table 2.5: Time required to retrieve CSI.
It is worth noting that the worst mechanisms in terms of delay are the tradi-
tional CRL and delta-CRL as requesting entities are downloading all the available
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CSI. However, the delay of the conventional CRL compared with the proposed
BECSI protocol decreases with the number of CSI requests. The variations in
time to download the CRL are due to the number of intermediate RSUs existing
in the connection between the CA and the vehicle sending the revocation request.
The average time to validate the status of a certificate in ADOPT is lower than
BECSI because of the number of hops that are necessary to retrieve the cached
CSI. BECSI in its MHT mode of operation is the fastest in average when validat-
ing the status of a certificate. However, this mode of operation has also a notable
deviation. While in ADOPT the high deviation is due to the number of hops,
in BECSI this deviation is mainly due to the number of ∆-trees that a vehicle
has to check when a certificate is not revoked. Figure 2.14 shows the number of
vehicles that are able to download the CSI in a particular range time depending
on the revocation mechanisms. As expected, with BECSI and ADOPT almost
all the 100 vehicles are able to download and process the CSI in less than 1,5
seconds. However, with Delta-CRLs and compressed-CRLs it takes from 4 to 8
seconds to retrieve the CSI.
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Figure 2.14: Histogram plot of time delay of the vehicles that receive the CSI
depending on the revocation mechanism.
Thus, BECSI evaluation shows that it not only improves in terms of band-
width but also in terms of scalability (increases the number of available reposito-
ries) and vulnerability (controlled WOV). In this way, BECSI becomes an oﬄine
certificate status validation mechanism as it does not need trusted responders to
operate. Therefore, BECSI significantly achieves great efficiency and scalability,
especially when deployed in heterogeneous vehicular networks.
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2.4 Impact of the revocation service in PKI prices
As final part of this thesis, we analyzed the economic impact of the revocation
service in the certificate prices. We noticed that with the appearance of novel
network environments (e.g. VANET), the quantity of CAs in the SSL certificate
market will become larger and the market concentration will diminish, but this
will not simple eliminate the oligopoly in the short-term. During the 90s, the
certification market, the competition among CAs appears mainly as price compe-
tition. In this situation, malignant price competition would be detrimental to the
interests of the users and lead to the CA’s pay crisis. Facing the situation, the
main CAs began to change the competitive strategies from basic price competi-
tion to price and quality of services (QoS) competition. To provide better QoS,
CAs have to improve their revocation service, and specifically the freshness of the
CRLs. Users will pay more for a service that issues certificate status information
faster. Time-to-revocation metric is visible to costumers by checking the CA’s
repositories where they publicize the revocation information.
We proved that there exists an oligopoly of CAs which compete in certificate
prices and QoS. We assume that the revocation probability is ex-ante uncertain
which is quite logical and intuitive. The number of revoked certificates varies
with time and in a manner that cannot be predicted with certainty. We showed
that an uncertain revocation probability introduces a systematic risk that does
not decrease by selling more certificates. If CAs are risk averse, this effect relaxes
price competition. The equilibrium characteristic of the certification market was
found by establishing a price competition model with different QoS.
Firstly, we defined a utility function. We maximized this utility, assuming that
the total utility U which users can get after they purchase a certificate consists of
two parts. The first part is wealth utility which represented by Uw the other part
is QoS utility which the applicant can get after they obtained the CA’s services,
represented by UQoS. The total utility U is defined as:
U = α1Uw + α2UQoS,∀αk ∈ [0, 1] and α1 + α2 = 1. (2.5)
where αi represents the significance level of U respectively. We assume that the
certification market is covered in full. Users will intend to maximize their utility,
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i.e.:
θ∗ = arg max
θ
U. (2.6)
We obtained the certificate price and the coverage in the equilibrium, which
allowed us to conclude that:
• In the equilibrium, two CAs with different revocation services achieve their
maximum gain, the CA with better revocation service obtains a higher price
for their certificates. This is mainly due to the fact that as both CAs have
associated the same probability of being compromised, but the QoS of the
first CA is better, this CA can set a higher price per certificate.
• In the equilibrium, the coverage that each CA should establish is the same
and is inversely proportional to the risk-aversion and the probability of
operating with a revoked certificate.
Finally, to corroborate the benefits of the presented model, we analyzed the
case of current SSL providers that issue digital certificates. An SSL certificate
can be obtained from amounts as low as $43 to as high as $3000 per year. Whilst
the type of encryption can be the same, the cost is determined by the rigor of the
certification process as well as the assurance and warranty that the vendor can
provide. Table 2.6 shows the prices and QoS that the leading CAs operating in the
SSL Certificate market are offering. The SSL Certificate market was traditionally
dominated by a small number of players, namely VeriSign and Thawte. Whilst
in a monopolistic position they had the capability of charging inflated prices for
a commodity product. However new providers with no necessity to hold prices
high were able to offer SSL certificates at far more reasonable prices.
To test whether these factors are determinant factors for the certificate prices,
we perform a multivariate regression analysis explaining the yearly price of SSL
certificates. General regression investigates and models the relationship between
a response (Certificate price) and predictors (Warranty, issuing interval and CRL
lifetime). Note that the response of this model is continuous, but we have both
continuous and categorical predictors. With this model we determine how the
certificate price changes as a particular predictor variable changes. We use data
from a survey of CAs performed in 2010 [1]. The obtained regression model
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is expressed in the following equations for high and low assurance certificates,
respectively:
Price/Y ear($) = 98, 4353 + 0, 000220857 W − 0, 549141 Itime + 8, 6116 1
CRLLf
,
P rice/Y ear($) = 20, 0405 + 0, 000220857 W − 0, 5491411 Itime + 8, 6116 1
CRLLf
,
where W denotes the warranty, Itime is the mean issuing time, and CRLLf is the
mean lifetime of the CRLs issued by the CA.
Both regression equations show that the coefficient of the predictor associated
to the CRL’s mean lifetime is significant. Thus, it is demonstrated that the
revocation service plays an important role when establishing the certificate prices.
SSL Provider Product
Name
Price/Year($) Warranty($) Assurance Issuing time Mean
CRL
lifetime
COMODO EnterpriseSSL
Platinum
311.80 1,000,000 High <1 hour 4 days
COMODO InstantSSL Pro 169.80 100,000 High <1 hour 4 days
Verisign Secure Site Pro
Cert
826.67 2,500,000 High 2-3 days 15 days
Verisign Managed PKI
for SSL Std
234.00 100,000 High 2-3 days 15 days
GeoTrust QuickSSL Pre-
mium
118.00 100,000 Low Immediate 10 days
GeoTrust True BusinessID 159.20 100,000 High 2 days 10 days
Go Daddy Standard SSL 42.99 10,000 Low Immediate 1 day
Go Daddy Standard Wild-
card
179.99 10,000 Low Immediate 1 day
Entrust Advantage SSL
Certificates
167.00 10,000 High 2 days 1 week
Entrust Standard SSL
Certificates
132.00 10,000 High 2 days 1 week
Thawte SSL 123 129.80 - Low Immediate 1 month
Thawte SGC Super cert 599.80 - High 2 days 1 month
Table 2.6: SSL Certificate Types and Services offered by main CAs [1].
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Chapter 3
Quality Indexes
The research presented in this thesis has been validated internationally in vari-
ous journals and conferences where experts have provided valuable comments and
insights that have improved our research. Tables 3.1 and and 3.2 show the publi-
cations made during the development of the thesis In both tables, the displayed
information gives evidence of the quality of each of them.
Year Publication Title Journal Quality Index
2013 BECSI : Bandwidth Efficient Cer-
tificate Status Information distri-
bution mechanism for VANETs
Mobile Information Systems Impact Factor (ISI) = 2.432
h-index= 23
2012 Risk based decision making for
Public Key Infrastructure using
fuzzy logic
International Journal of In-
novative Computing, Informa-
tion and Control
Impact Factor (ISI) = 1.667
h-index= 32
2012 A Modeling of Certificate Revo-
cation and Its Application to Syn-
thesis of Revocation Traces
IEEE Transactions on Infor-
mation Forensics and Security
Impact Factor (ISI) = 1.340
h-index= 41
2012 COACH: COllaborative certifi-
cate stAtus CHecking mechanism
for VANETs
Journal of Network and Com-
puter Applications
Impact Factor (ISI) = 1.065
h-index= 28
Table 3.1: Quality Indexes of the articles published in journals.
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Year Title Conference Quality Index
2012 Impact of the Revocation Service
in PKI Prices
Information and Communica-
tions Security (ICICS 2012)
CORE Ranking B
h-index= 20
2012 On the Self-similarity Nature of
the Revocation Data
in Information Security Confer-
ence (ISC 2012)
CORE Ranking B
h-index= 16
2012 Toward Revocation Data Han-
dling Efficiency in VANETs
in Communication Technologies
for Vehicles (Nets4Cars 2012)
No CORE ranking
h-index= 2
2009 PKIX certificate status in hybrid
MANETs
Information Security Theory and
Practice. Smart Devices, Per-
vasive Systems, and Ubiquitous
Networks (WISTP 2009)
CORE Ranking C
h-index= 10
Table 3.2: Quality Indexes of the articles presented at international conferences.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
In this thesis, we have analyzed the revocation process and proposed a set of
mechanisms to provide an efficient revocation service for VANETs. Our results
have shown that the proposed mechanisms can achieve the targeted security re-
quirements. In addition, the detailed performance evaluation and security anal-
ysis have indicated that the proposed protocols are secure and efficient. The
achievements accomplished in this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• We have analyzed real empirical data collected from the leading CAs. We
have shown that the revocation process is statistically self-similar (irre-
spective of when data were collected during the 3-year period 2008-2011
or from which CA). Moreover, we have demonstrated that the degree of
self-similarity, which can be measured in terms of the Hurst parameter H,
is a function of the overall utilization of the revocation service and can be
used for measuring the “burstiness” of the revocation process (i.e. the more
bursts in the revocation process the higher H). Hence, leading CAs share
similar Hurst parameters even though they operate in different market seg-
ments.
• The intermittent connectivity between the entities of vehicular networks and
security infrastructure results in incomplete or outdated revocation infor-
mation at the recipients of signed messages. This incomplete/outdated in-
formation puts the recipients in a dilemma while accepting messages signed
using certificates that are not present in the CRLs at the On Board Unit. To
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this respect, we have presented a new metric that quantifies the confidence
the recipients can have while accepting messages signed using certificates
that are not present in the CRLs at the OBU. Moreover, we have devel-
oped a systematic methodology to build a fuzzy system that models risk
and assists the user in the decision making process related to certificate
revocation. Our system not only considers the possibility of taking as valid
a certificate that has been revoked but also other key risk factors. In this
respect, we have identified potential risk sources involved in the revocation
system and we have characterized them using fuzzy logic. The inputs given
to the fuzzy system can be inferred from a standard CRL and as CRLs are
accessible to any PKI user, in practice, everybody can take advantage of
our fuzzy system. The output of our system is a measure of the risk of
operating with a particular CRL at a given instant. Based on this output,
users can either decide whether to trust or not a given signed message.
• We have proposed two efficient revocation mechanism for VANETs, which
substantially reduce the overhead of the certificate status checking. These
checking mechanisms are based on an extended-CRL. The main advantage
of this extended-CRL is that the road-side units and repository vehicles can
build an efficient structure based on an authenticated hash tree to respond
to status checking requests inside the VANET, saving time and bandwidth.
Thus, we decrease the vulnerability window that a misbehaving vehicle
has and this results in higher safety level for VANET. Both mechanisms
are resistant to the most known revocation attacks. In addition, they can
be efficiently integrated with any PKI and/or any misbehavior detection
scheme for VANETs and they fulfill the IEEE 1609.2 Standard.
• Finally, we have studied the economic impact of the revocation service in
the certificate price. We have shown that the market of certificate providers
can be described as an oligopoly where oligarchs compete not only in price
but also in quality of service. We have modeled this oligopoly using a
game theoretic approach to find the prices in the equilibrium. We have
been able to capture the QoS of the products offered by a CA, by means
of the timeliness of the revocation mechanism and the security level. In
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our model of the certification industry with profit-maximizing CAs and a
continuum of individuals, we showed that although the undercutting process
in certification prices seems similar to the price setting behavior of firms
in Bertrand competition there exists a crucial difference depending on the
QoS of the revocation service. The solution of the game for two CAs in the
oligopoly that offer certificates with different QoS shows that the revenues
of the CA which provides a better revocation mechanism and a higher
security level are larger. Therefore, a CA has to take into account not only
the probability of operating with a revoked certificate, but also the quality
of the revocation mechanism and the security level when setting the prices
of its certificates and the compensation expenses. Thus, any CA should
comprehensively consider the difference in quality of its services compared
with other CAs.
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Abstract
Certificate revocation is a challenging task, especially in mobile net-
work environments such as vehicular ad Hoc networks (VANETs). Ac-
cording to the IEEE 1609.2 security standard for VANETs, public key
infrastructure (PKI) will provide this functionality by means of certifi-
cate revocation lists (CRLs). When a certificate authority (CA) needs to
revoke a certificate, it globally distributes CRLs. These lists must be dis-
tributed as quickly and efficiently as possible without over-burdening the
network. In this article, we propose BECSI, a Bandwidth Efficient Cer-
tificate Status Information mechanism to efficiently distribute certificate
status information (CSI) in VANETs. By means of Merkle hash trees
(MHT), BECSI allows to retrieve authenticated CSI not only from the
infrastructure but also from vehicles acting as mobile repositories. Since
these MHTs are significantly smaller than the CRLs, BECSI reduces the
load on the CSI repositories and improves the response time for the vehi-
cles. Additionally, BECSI improves the freshness of the CSI by combining
the use of delta-CRLs with MHTs. Thus, vehicles that have cached the
most current CRL can download delta-CRLs to have a complete list of re-
voked certificates. Once a vehicle has the whole list of revoked certificates,
it can act as mobile repository.
Keywords: PKI, Revocation, VANET.
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1 Introduction
Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have recently attracted extensive atten-
tions as a promising technology for revolutionizing the transportation systems.
VANETs consist of entities including On-Board Units (OBUs) and infrastruc-
ture Road-Side Units (RSUs). Mobile nodes are capable of communicating with
each other (i.e. Vehicle to Vehicle Communication -V2V communication) and
with the RSUs (i.e. Vehicle to Infrastructure Communication -V2I commu-
nication). Multi-hop communication facilitates information exchange among
network nodes that are not in direct communication range [3, 14], by means of
short range wireless technology based on IEEE 802.11p.
Obviously, any malicious behaviors, such as injecting beacons with false in-
formation, modifying and replaying the previously disseminated messages, could
be fatal to the other users. Thus, identifying the message issuer is mandatory
to reduce the risk of such attacks. According to the IEEE 1609.2 standard [13],
vehicular networks will rely on the public key infrastructure (PKI). In PKI,
a certification authority issues an authentic digital certificate for each node in
the network. Due to misbehavior, intentional or otherwise, certificates need to
be revoked in order to limit the risk that potential misuse poses to the rest of
the network. The IEEE 1609.2 standard [13] states that VANETs will depend
on certificate revocation lists (CRLs) to achieve revocation. CRLs are black
lists that enumerate revoked certificates along with the date of revocation and,
optionally, the reasons for revocation.
As VANETs can have a great amount of nodes (i.e. vehicles), CRLs will
be large. Moreover, each vehicle in the network will own many temporary
certificates (also called pseudonyms) to protect the users’ privacy. Consequently,
these lists will require hundreds of Megabytes [12,21,35]. However, distributing
and updating CRLs to all vehicles raises a challenge. If there are no more
communication media than the own VANET, no trusted-third parties (like the
corresponding CA) can be assumed to be permanently available. Thus, online
certificate status protocol (OCSP) [28] or, in general, any online solution is
not suitable for this context. Several CRLs distribution protocols have been
proposed for this purpose. For instance, to distribute these lists efficiently,
authors in [26] proposed revocation using compressed CRLs. They divided the
CRL into several self-verifiable parts and strongly reduced its size by using
Bloom filters. Authors in [12] also propose the use of Bloom filters to store the
revoked certificates for increasing the search speed in the CRL. On the other
hand, authors in [22] proposed to use regional CAs and short lived certificates to
2
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decrease the number of entries in the CRL. We provide more information about
these and other similar proposals in Section 2 but as a general conclusion, we
could say that most of the research efforts in this context have been put on trying
to reduce the size of the CRL, either trying to split it or trying to compress it.
In this article, we address the CRL distribution problem by exploiting the
combination of three well-known mechanisms: (1) delta-CRL [1], (2) Merkle
hash tree (MHT) [18], and (3) one-way hash chain [16]. By combining these three
mechanisms, we design a Bandwidth Efficient Certificate Status Information
(BECSI) protocol, that allows increasing the availability and freshness of the
certificate status information (CSI) and at the same time reduces the bandwidth
necessary to check the validity of a given certificate. BECSI takes advantage of
V2V communication to create mobile repositories so that vehicles do not have to
rely solely in the RSUs to obtain CSI. We aim to improve the distribution of CSI
by transmitting the revocation information that is unknown to a particular user
during the validity period of a CRL. The main idea behind BECSI is to allow
vehicles requesting for new CSI during the validity period of the current CRL.
Thus, revocations that occur during the validity period of the CRL will not
be unknown to the vehicles during this whole validity period, reducing the risk
of operating with an unknown revoked certificate. Therefore, BECSI reduces
the peak bandwidth load associated with the CSI requests as there are more
entities in the network that can answer these requests. To achieve, we combine
the issuance of delta-CRLs and MHT.
By using the underlying concept of delta-CRLs, we implement a more ef-
ficient way of using of distributing CSI inside the VANET. To help minimize
frequent downloads of lengthy CRLs, delta-CRLs are published aperiodically.
On the other hand, BECSI codes the information included in the CRL and delta-
CRLs in different MHTs. Using these MHTs, vehicles are able to act as mobile
repositories. To achieve that, we embed some little extra information to the
CRL such that allows us to create an efficient and secure request/response pro-
tocol. In more detail, we propose a way of efficiently embedding a MHT within
the structure of the standard CRL to generate the so-called extended-CRL and
extended-delta-CRL. To create these extended lists, we use an standard way of
adding extra information to the CRL. Our extension contains all the necessary
information to allow any vehicle or VANET infrastructure element that pos-
sesses the extended-CRL to build the BECSI tree, i.e., a hash tree with the CSI
of the CRL. Using this BECSI tree, any entity possessing the extended-CRL can
act as repository and efficiently answer to certificate status checking requests
of other vehicles. As we will demonstrate by simulation, this makes the distri-
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bution of CSI more efficient than distributing complete CRLs (even they are
compressed), reducing the data that have to be transmitted over the VANET.
We must stress that any entity possessing an extended-CRL can act as BECSI
repository but that a BECSI repository is not a TTP. In other words, BECSI
is oﬄine, which means that no online trusted entity (like a CA) is needed for
authenticating the responses produced by BECSI repositories.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
background related to our mechanism. In Section 3 we describe in depth BECSI.
In Section 4, we evaluate the proposed mechanisms. Finally, Section 5 concludes
this paper.
2 Background
In this section, first we start describing existing revocation proposals for VANET.
Then, we give a brief overview of Merkle Hash Trees (MHT) [18], which is one
of the foundations of the proposed certificate validation mechanism. Finally we
describe the basics of hash chains.
2.1 VANET revocation mechanisms
2.1.1 Centralized revocation approaches
The IEEE 1609.2 standard [13] proposes an architecture based on the existence
of a Trusted Third Party (TTP), which manages the revocation service. In
this architecture each vehicle possesses several short-lived certificates (used as
pseudonyms), to ensure users’ privacy. However, short-lived certificates are not
enough as compromised or faulty vehicles could still endanger other vehicles until
the end of their certificate lifetimes. Thus, the IEEE 1609.2 promotes the use
of CRLs to manage revocation while assuming pervasive roadside architecture.
Other proposals in the literature also assume the existence of a TTP to
provide the revocation service. Raya et al. [25] propose the use of a tamper-
proof device (TPD) to store the certificates. A TTP is in charge of preload-
ing the cryptographic material in the TPD. Thus, when a vehicle is compro-
mised/misbehaving, it can be removed from the network by just revoking the
TPD. To ensure that messages from this OBU are not considered valid once the
certificates have been revoked, revocation information must also be distributed
via CRLs. To reduce the bandwidth consumed by the transmission of CRLs,
these authors proposed to compress the CRLs by using Bloom filters. However,
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this method gives rise to false positives which degrades the reliability of the
revocation service.
However, even compressed, timely distributing CRLs to all vehicles is not
trivial. Some authors [22, 23], instead of using a single central authority, have
proposed the use of regional certification authorities which must develop some
trust relationships. Papadimitratos et al. [24] suggest restricting the scope of the
CRL within a region. Visiting vehicles from other regions require to obtain tem-
porary certificates. Thus, a vehicle will have to acquire temporary certificates if
it is traveling outside its registered region. The authors also propose breaking
the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) into different pieces, then transmitting
these pieces using Fountain or Erasure codes, so that a vehicle can reconstruct
the CRL after receiving a certain number of pieces. Similarly, in [32], each CA
distributes the CRL to the RSUs in its domain through Ethernet. Then, the
RSUs broadcast the new CRL to all the vehicles in that domain. In the case
RSUs do not completely cover the domain of a CA, V2V communications are
used to distribute the CRL to all the vehicles [15]. This mechanism is also used
in [2, 7], where it is detailed a public key infrastructure mechanism based on
bilinear mapping. Revocation is accomplished through the distribution of CRL
that is stored by each user.
2.1.2 Decentralized revocation approaches
Decentralized revocation mechanisms provide the revocation service without as-
suming the existence of a TTP. Some proposals in the literature divert from the
IEEE 1609.2 standard and use online status checking protocols instead of CRLs
to provide a revocation service in a decentralized manner. This is the case,
of the Ad-hoc Distributed OCSP for Trust (ADOPT) [17], which uses cached
OCSP responses that are distributed and stored on intermediate nodes. Other
group of proposals bases the revocation service on detecting a vehicle to be mis-
behaving by a set of other vehicles. Then, the detecting set may cooperatively
revoke the credential of the misbehaving node from their neighborhood. Moore
et al. proposed in [19] a revocation mechanism aiming to prevent an attacker
from falsely voting against legitimate nodes. Raya et al. in [25] proposed a
mechanism to temporarily revoke an attacker if the CA is unavailable. To do
so, the number of accusing neighbor users must exceed a threshold. A similar
mechanism based also on vehicle voting is proposed in [34]. Again, by means of
a voting scheme, a vehicle can be marked as misbehaving and then be revoked
by its neighbors.
Another proposal uses a game-theoretic revocation approach to define the
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best strategy for each individual vehicle [5,27]. These mechanisms provide incen-
tives to guarantee the successful revocation of the malicious nodes. Moreover,
thanks to the records of past behavior, the mechanism is able to dynamically
adapt the parameters to nodes’ reputations and establish the optimal Nash
equilibrium on-the-fly, minimizing the cost of the revocation.
Finally, there are some hybrid approaches that are neither totally centralized
nor decentralized ( [10, 33]). For instance, authors in [9] propose the use of
authenticated data structures to issue CSI. Using these schemes, the revocation
service is decentralized to transmit the CSI but still depends on a CA to decide
when a node should be evicted from the VANET.
2.2 The Merkle Hash Tree
A Merkle hash tree (MHT) [18] is essentially a tree structure that is built with
a One Way Hash Function (OWHF). The leaf nodes hold the hash values of the
data of interest (data1,data2,...) and the internal nodes hold the hash values
that result from applying the OWHF to the concatenation of the hash values
of its children nodes. In this way, a large number of separate data can be tied
to a single hash value: the hash at the root node of the tree. MHTs can be
used to provide an efficient and highly-scalable way to distribute revocation
information, as it is described in [8] for MANETs (Mobile Ad Hoc Networks).
A sample MHT is presented in Fig. 1. This hash tree is binary because each
node has at most two children or equivalently, two sibling nodes are combined
to form a parent node in the next level. We will call these siblings as ”left” and
”right” and a detailed explanation of how to build the hash tree for BECSI is
given in Section 3.3.
root
00H 01H 02H 03H
20H
left right
left right left right
20 10 11( | )rootH H h H H 
010 0 01( | )H H Hh 011 2 03( | )H H Hh
00 ( )H h data1 01 ( )H h data2 02 ( )H h data3 03 ( )H h data4
Figure 1: Sample binary Merkle Hash Tree.
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A MHT relies on the properties of the One Way Hash Functions (OWHF). It
exploits the fact that an OWHF is at least 10,000 times faster to compute than
a digital signature, so the majority of the cryptographic operations performed
in the revocation system are hash functions instead of digital signatures. In
addition, by storing the internal node values, it is possible to verify that any of
the leaf nodes is part of the tree without revealing any of the other data.
2.3 Hash chains
The idea of “hash chain” was first proposed by Lamport [16] in 1981 and sug-
gested to be used for safeguarding against password eavesdropping. A hash
chain C is a set of values s0, ..., sn for n ∈ Z such that si = h(si−1) for some
one-way hash function h, where i ∈ [1, n] and s0 is a valid input for h.
Note that hash chains are preimage resistent, i.e., by knowing si, si−1
cannot be generated by those who do not know the value s0, however given
si−1, its correctness can be verified by hashing h(si). This property of hash
chains has evolved from the property of one-way hash functions. Additionally,
hash chains are also second preimage resistent, collision resistent and generate
pseudo-random numbers.
In most of the hash-chain applications, first sn is securely distributed and
then the elements of the hash chain are spent (or used) one by one by starting
from si−1 and continuing until the value of s0 is reached. At this point the hash
chain is said to be exhausted and the whole process should be repeated again
with a different s to reinitialize the systems.
3 BECSI: Bandwidth Efficient Certificate Sta-
tus Information distribution mechanism
In this Section, we present BECSI, a bandwidth efficient mechanism for certifi-
cate status checking over VANETs based on the use of Merkle Hash Trees and
hash chains. First we introduce the motivation, goal and security architecture
needed to support BECSI, and next we describe the mechanism in depth.
3.1 Motivation and Goal
Despite the short-comings related to propagation of revocation information, the
need for trusted authorities like CAs to ensure authentication has motivated
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researchers to propose PKI based security for vehicular networks. Mainly, these
mechanisms intend to provide the following set of requirements:
1. Reliability : The revocation service must be available at all times.
2. Memory : Minimum amount of memory should be required as validation
is often carried out in constrained environments.
3. Bandwidth: Communication bandwidth should be minimal.
4. Freshness: Revocation data should be as updated as possible.
Proposals described in Section 2 mainly deal with the bandwidth require-
ment. By compressing the CRL, using state-of-the-art coding techniques or
partitioning the CRL, these approaches reduce the time required to download
CSI. In addition, authors intend to provide a reliable revocation service by de-
centralizing the CSI distribution points. However, none of these works deals
with the freshness of the CSI. With BECSI we aim not only to reduce the com-
munication overhead but also to increase the availability and freshness of CSI
while keeping a reasonable computation cost.
CRLs are normally published in intervals meaning that there will not be any
new revocation information available between the issuance and the update of
the CRL. Newer revocations will thus be delayed until the next update occurs.
High-security applications (e.g. safety applications) cannot cope with this lack
of fresh information and render the traditional CRL approach almost useless in
VANETs. To solve these problems, BECSI includes an extension to the standard
CRL that allow RSUs to act as an oﬄine repositories. Thus vehicles do not have
to download the whole extended CRL, and they can just query about the status
of a particular certificate.
3.2 Security Architecture
The security architecture is an adaptation of a mesh PKI system to a vehicular
scenario constructed of peer-to-peer CA relationships. This architecture consist
of 4 different types of nodes (see Fig. 2):
1. Certification Authorities: CAs are responsible for holding and managing
the credentials and identities of all the vehicles which are registered under
its hood. CAs are responsible for generating the set of certificates that
are stored in each OBU. They are also responsible for managing the revo-
cation information and making it accessible to the rest of the entities. By
8
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94
 A set of ∆-trees which are constructed from the serial number of the
certificates that are revoked during the validity interval of the base-CRL,
i.e, they are constructed from the data contained in the delta-CRLs.
3.3.1 BECSI base-tree
The base-tree is a binary hash tree where each node represents a revoked cer-
tificate that is contained in the base-CRL. We denote by Ni,j the nodes within
the BECSI base-tree, where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2...} represent respectively the i-th level
and the j-th node in the i-th level. We denote by Hi,j the cryptographic (hash)
value stored by node Ni,j (see Fig. 3).
20 10 11( | )rootH H h H H 
010 0 01( | )H H Hh
000 ( )h cH  101 ( )h cH  202 ( )h cH  303 ( )h cH 
11N10N
011 2 03( | )H H Hh
00N 01N 02N 03N
20N
0min c
1max c
0min c
0max c 1min c 1max c
2min c
3max c
2min c
2max c
3min c
3max c
0min c
3max c
Figure 3: Sample BECSI base-tree.
We denote by Ni,j the nodes within the MHT where i and j represent re-
spectively the i-th level and the j-th node. We denote by Hi,j the cryptographic
variable stored by node Ni,j .
Nodes at level 0 are called “leaves“ and they represent the data stored in
the tree. In the case of revocation, leaves represent the set Φ of certificates that
have been revoked,
Φ = {c0, c1, . . . , cj , . . . , cn} . (1)
Where cj is the data stored by leaf N0,j . Then, H0,j is computed as:
H0,j = h(cj) , (2)
where h is a OWHF.
To build the MHT, a set of t adjacent nodes at a given level i (Ni,j , Ni,j+1,
. . . , Ni,j+t−1) are combined into one node in the upper level, which we denote
10
95
by Ni+1,k. Then, Hi+1,k is obtained by applying h to the concatenation of the
t cryptographic variables:
Hi+1,k = h(Hi,j |Hi,j+1| . . . |Hi,j+t−1). (3)
At the top level there is only one node called the “root“. Hroot is a digest
for all the data stored in the MHT.
The sample MHT of Fig. 1 is a binary tree because adjacent nodes are
combined in pairs to form a node in the next level (t = 2) and Hroot = H2,0.
We define the the Digest as the concatenation of the certification authority
distinguished number, the root hash and the validity period of the certificate
status data. Once created, the Digest is signed by the CA.
Digestbase = {DNCA, Hroot, V alidityPeriod}SIGCA .
We denote as the Pathcj as the set of cryptographic values necessary to
compute Hroot from the leaf cj .
It is worth noting that Digest is trusted data because it is signed by the CA
and it is unique within the tree while Path is different for each leaf. Thus, If
the MHT provides a response with the proper Pathcj and the MHT Digest, any
vehicle can verify whether cj ∈ Φ.
For instance, let us suppose that a certain user wants to find out whether c1
belongs to the sample MHT of Fig. 1. Then,
Pathc1 = {H0,0, H1,1},
Digest = {DNCA, H2,0, V alidityPeriod}SIGCA .
The response verification consists in checking that H2,0 computed from the
Pc1 matches H2,0 included in the Digest:
Hroot = H2,0 = h(h(h(c1)|H0,0)|H1,1) .
Note that the BECSI base-tree can be built by a trusted third party (e.g. a
CA) and distributed to a non-TTP because a leaf cannot be added or deleted to
Φ without modifying Hroot, which is included in the Digest and as the Digest
is signed, it cannot be forged by a non-TTP. To do such a thing, an attacker
would need to find a pre-image of a OWHF which is computationally infeasible
by definition.
3.3.2 BECSI ∆-trees
BECSI ∆-trees are constructed in the same way that the base-tree. However
they present two differences with respect to the base-tree:
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 Each leaf of the ∆-trees refers to certificates that were revoked during the
validity interval of the base-CRL.
 The root of the ∆-tree is calculated by hashing the top-hash of the tree
with the corresponding value of a hash chain. For more details about the
construction of the hash chain see Section 3.4.3.
Fig. 4 shows the simplest possible ∆-tree which contains only two revoked
certificates.
4min c
4max c 5min c 5max c
404 ( )H h c 505 ( )H h c
1U
012 4 05( | )H H Hh
12N
04N 05N
21N
1
1
12( | )rootH h U H 
2U
21 ( )U h U 32 ( )U h U
1U dU
Figure 4: Sample BECSI ∆-tree.
Note that these ∆-trees have the same properties that the base-tree, so that
the root node is unique and cannot be forged. Thus, the Digest is composed as:
Digest∆i = {DNCA, Hi∆root, V alidityPeriod}SIGCA .
Similarly, the Path consist of the set of cryptographic values necessary to
compute Hi∆root from the leaf cj . Note that this path is shorter in the case of
the leafs of the ∆-trees because they contain less revoked certificates than the
base-tree. The length of the ∆-trees is fixed as they are constructed from the
delta-CRLs that have fixed size.
3.4 Operating Mode
BECSI consists in four phases. During the first phase of Bootstraping, the CA
creates the ”extended-CRL”, that is, a CRL in which a signed extension is
appended. This extension will allow non-trusted third parties (non-TTP) to
answer CSI requests in an off-line way when required. Once this extended-CRL
has been constructed, it is distributed to the RSUs. In the second phase of
Repository Creation, a non-trusted entity (i.e. a RSU or a vehicle) gets the
extended-CRL and becomes a CSI repository for other VANET entities. Next,
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during the third phase CSI Update, the CA creates ”extended-delta-CRLs“ of
fixed size. A delta-CRL is a time-stamped digitally signed revocation list con-
taining information about new revocations that occurred since the issuance of
a prior base-CRL. A base-CRL is a complete CRL that contains a complete
list of revoked certificates, to which the revocation list in the delta-CRL needs
to be applied to produce the latest list of revoked certificates. Base and delta
CRLs have similar data structures. To construct these fixed-size delta-CRLs,
the CA has to wait to have enough new revoked certificates. Therefore, the
issuance of these delta-CRLs is aperiodic. Once, the delta-CRL is constructed,
the CA appends a signed extension corresponding to the root node of the ∆-tree.
The extended-delta-CRLs are distributed to the RSUs and mobile repositories.
Moreover, the CA broadcasts the number of issued extended-delta-CRLs to
avoid CSI suppression attacks. Finally, in the fourth stage of Certificate Status
Checking, vehicles can use an efficient protocol to obtain the CSI from any avail-
able VANET repository. Henceforward, we give a more detailed description of
these three stages.
3.4.1 Bootstraping
In this first phase, the CA creates the extended-CRL and delivers it to the RSUs.
An extended-CRL is basically a standard CRL with an appended extension. This
extension can be used by non-TTP (e.g. RSUs and vehicles inside the VANET)
to act as repositories and answer to CSI requests. All the tasks of this system
initialization are performed in the CA locally.
These are the steps that the CA must carry out:
1. The CA creates a tbs-CRL (to be signed CRL), i.e., a list including the
serial number of the certificates that have been revoked (along with the
date of revocation), the identity of the CA, some time-stamps to establish
the validity period, etc.
2. The CA creates the BECSI base-tree, i.e., a MHT constructed with the se-
rial numbers within the previous tbs-CRL as leaves of the tree. The BECSI
base-tree is a binary tree, and is constructed following the methodology
explained in Section 3.3. The leaves of the base-tree are ordered by in-
creasing serial number. Therefore, the bottom left leaf stores the revoked
certificate with lowest serial number. Note that if the BECSI base-tree is
formed by an odd number n of leaves, there is a leaf N0,n−1 that does not
have a pair. Then the single node is simply carried forward to the upper
level by hashing its H0,n−1 value. We proceed in the same way if any i-th
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level is formed by an odd number n of nodes. Once created the MHT, the
CA obtains the root hash.
3. The CA calculates the extension, which consists basically of the Digest
and the first value U0 of a hash chain. The hash chain will be used to make
users aware of the number of issued delta-CRLs. Recall that the Digest is
calculated as the concatenation of the CA distinguished number, the root
hash of the base-tree and the validity period of the CSI, and after that
signed by the CA. Obviously, the distinguished number and the validity
period should be the same than the ones contained in the tbs-CRL. In
fact, the BECSI base-tree is just a different way of representing the CSI,
but the hash tree will be valid during the same time and will provide the
same information than the CRL. Once calculated, this Digest is appended
to the tbs-CRL.
4. The CA creates the hash chain. To that end, the CA picks a random
value for Ud. By hashing this value iteratively, the CA forms a one-way
chain of self-authenticating values, and assigns the values sequentially to
the time intervals (one value per delta-CRL). The last value of the chain
U0 is appended to the tbs-CRL along with the Digest, generating the
tbs-extended-CRL.
5. The CA signs the tbs-extended-CRL, generating the extended-CRL. Notice
that this second overall signature not only authenticates all the CSI, but
also binds this CSI to the Digest. The extended-CRL is only slightly larger
than the standard CRL, as we will show later in Section 4.
6. Finally, the CA distributes copies of the extended-CRL to the designated
RSUs, which will act as the typical PKI repositories, in the same manner
as they would do with a standard CRL.
After this first phase, the RSUs have a copy of the extended-CRL, which
contains exactly the same CSI than a standard CRL and it is valid for the same
time. The advantage of an extended-CRL is that any non-TTP in possession
of it can generate again the BECSI base-tree locally, and obtain the root hash.
As the extended-CRL also includes the Digest, which is signed by the CA, this
entity has an authenticated version of the BECSI base-tree and can answer to
CSI requests in an off-line way.
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3.4.2 CSI Repositories creation
In this phase, RSUs and freewill vehicles become new CSI repositories of the
VANET. Vehicles that become mobile repositories allow the distribution of CSI
in areas with poor coverage. To become a repository an entity must follow the
following steps:
1. The entity obtains the extended-CRL (and extended-delta-CRLs)either
from the CA or from another entity that has an up-to-date copy of the
extended-CRL (and extended-delta-CRLs) in its cache. Notice that the
CA uses a secure wireline to communicate with the RSUs, while the RSUs
use a wireless link to communicate with the vehicles.
2. Once the extended-CRL (and extended-delta-CRLs) has been downloaded,
the entity verifies that the signature of the extended-CRL (and extended-
delta-CRLs) is valid and corresponds to the CA. If so, the entity generates
locally the BECSI base-tree (and ∆-trees) using the serial numbers within
the extended-CRL (and extended-delta-CRLs) and following the same al-
gorithm than the CA (as explained in Section 3.3). The root hash of
the tree created from the extended-CRL (and extended-delta-CRLs) en-
tries must match the signed root value contained in the Digestbase (and
Digest∆i).
3. At this moment, the entity can respond to any status checking request
from any vehicle until the corresponding Digest expires.
3.4.3 CSI Update
After the first two phases, any entity of the VANET is capable of downloading
the CRL from a repository or it can just check the status of a given certificate
using the capabilities of a MHT. However, in order to improve the freshness of
the revocation information and avoid potential bottlenecks when obtaining new
CSI, BECSI also provides CSI updates during the validity interval of the CRL.
To alleviate high CRL distribution costs, BECSI uses a hybrid delta-CRL
scheme. BECSI issues a variable number of delta-CRLs during the validity
interval of the base CRLs (as shown in Fig. 5), reducing the total bandwidth
load on the CRL distribution points (RSU and mobile repositories). The size
of these delta-CRLs is fixed a priori by the CA. Consequently, the number of
delta-CRLs issued during the validity interval of the base-CRL depends on the
number of revoked certificates during this interval.
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BaseCRL0 BaseCRL1
ΔCRL01 ΔCRL02 ΔCRL03 ΔCRL11 ΔCRL12 ΔCRL13 ΔCRL14 ΔCRL21 ΔCRL22
BaseCRL2
t0 t1 = t0 + Ts t2 = t1 + Ts
1U 2U
···
3U 1U 2U 3U 4U 1U 2U
Figure 5: Delta-CRLs Issuance Scheduling.
To ensure that any vehicle entity is aware of the number of issued delta-
CRLs, the CA discloses a value Ui of a hash chain each time a new delta-CRL
is issued. This hash value allows users to make sure of how many ∆-trees have
been published by the CA. Thus a non-TTP cannot lie about the amount of
revocation information that has been published. Note that the corresponding
value Ui is used to calculate the root value of the ∆-tree, binding the ∆-tree
to the Ui. BECSI takes advantage of the physical layer used in VANETs to
transmit the hash value Ui to vehicles.
The physical layer in VANETs is based on the Dedicated short range com-
munication (DSRC) protocol [14]. DSRC is a 75 MHz band in the 5.9 GHz
frequency range with seven non-overlapping channels. Two different channel
types are described for use in DSRC. The first type is the control channel, re-
ferred to as CCH, which is a single channel reserved for short, high-priority
application and system control messages [13]. During the CCH, every node
broadcasts a beacon that provides trajectory and other information about the
vehicle. The other type of channel is the service channel, or SCH, which has
six different 10 MHz channels that support a wider range of applications and
data transfer. During CCH time channel activities on SCH are suspended and
vice versa. BECSI uses the CCH to transmit the corresponding Ui. Each node
in the VANET monitors the CCH during time periods designated as control
channel intervals. The time period for an entire CCH Interval and SCH Interval
is called a Sync Interval (see Fig. 6). Between CCH intervals, nodes may switch
to participate on a SCH for applications such as file downloads.
CCH Interval SCH Interval CCH Interval ···
Guard Interval (4ms)
SCH Interval
Sync Interva l (100 m s)
Figure 6: CCH/SCH timing.
16
101
Each regional CA sends to RSUs an authenticated message M containing
the corresponding Ui and a time-stamp.
CA→ RSUs : M = [Ui, T imeStamp]SignCA
Note that regional CAs are expected to have a wireline to communicate with
their corresponding RSUs. The time stamp included in the message allows
vehicles to verify the freshness of the message. Thus, it is avoided potential
forgery or replay attacks. The size of this message is 72 bytes:
 64 bytes for the ECDSA-256 CA’s signature.
 4 bytes for the timestamp representing seconds UTC since the epoch
(’1970-01-01 00:00:00’ UTC).
 4 bytes for representing the Ui value.
During the CCH interval, RSUs broadcast this message to OBUs in range.
However, not in every CCH interval M is sent. Depending on the certificate
revocation rate, each regional CA will choose the rate at which they have to
transmit the Ui to the vehicles. Normally, vehicles will remain under the cov-
erage of an RSU for more than 100ms. Therefore, CAs have to adjust the
frequency at which M is sent to avoid vehicles receiving multiple copies of the
same message. Notice that as M is signed by the CA, any vehicle can act as
repository and transmit this message without being able to modify it. The hash
chain is initialized with secret nonce that the CA generates (Ud) and includes
in the extended -CRL. By hashing Ud, the other Ui nodes of the chain are cal-
culated. As the validity interval of the CRL is finite, the length of the chain is
also finite, i.e., U0 is the last node of the chain that is calculated after hashing
d times Ud. Thus each value can be calculated applying a hash function h to
the previous value, and the first value of the hash chain is the secret nonce Ud.
Ud
h→ Ud−1 h→ . . . h→ Ui h→ U2 h→ U1 h→ U0
On the other hand, BECSI not only issues delta-CRLs aperiodically, it also
includes an extension in the delta-CRLs as it does with the base-CRL. Thus,
any VANET entity that has cached the extended-delta-CRL can construct the
BECSI ∆-tree (as shown in Sec.2.2). With this MHT, a non-TTP can respond
to any entity requesting the status of a particular certificate. The response can
be authenticated by the requesting party by means of the extension.
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3.4.4 Certificate status checking
After the third phase, RSUs and some vehicles will be able to act as repositories.
The last stage of the mechanism consists in providing the certificate status
information to any vehicle that needs to validate the status of a certificate.
Under BECSI, vehicles have to option to check the status of a certificate:
 Downloading the standard CRL and the available delta-CRLs from any
repository. This option is desirable when the connectivity to the infras-
tructure is high and the network congestion is low. For instance, in a
urban scenario during non-rush hours where the deployed infrastructure
should be enough to serve the CSI.
 Requesting the status of a particular certificate to any repository. With
this option, the requesting vehicle only gets the status of a single certifi-
cate, so the bandwidth load is low. Vehicles should use this option when
they need a quick response (e.g. authenticating safety messages), or when
the VANET conditions are not good enough to download the whole CRL
and delta-CRLs.
Independently of the option, vehicles that need to check the status of a cer-
tificate must locate a valid repository. To do so, vehicles use a Service Discovery
Protocol (SDP) to find a RSU or a vehicle that is acting as repository. Once the
repository has been located, the vehicles can query for the CRL or query for the
status of a particular certificate using the following status checking protocol.
The protocol for status information exchange is based on the hash tree struc-
ture and it allows checking the integrity of a single extended-CRL or extended-
delta-CRL entry with only some hash material plus the Digest (included in the
extension) and the corresponding Ui. On the one hand, this is much more effi-
cient than broadcasting the entire extended-CRL and the extended-delta-CRLs.
On the other hand, the mechanism is fully oﬄine (the only trusted authority is
the CA), which is a very good feature because sometimes it may be impossible
for vehicles to reach the CA due to lack of coverage.
Hence, a vehicle that needs to check the status of a certificate must follow
the next steps:
1. The vehicle uses a service discovery protocol to find either a RSU or a
mobile repository inside its coverage range for status checking.
2. The vehicle sends the serial number of the certificate that is going to be
verified to the repository. The repository searches the target certificate
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in the base-tree and the ∆-trees. In the case the certificate is found,
the repository sends the Path, i.e., the hash values of the nodes of the
base-tree (or ∆-tree) which are needed to calculate the signed root. To
calculate the path, the repository follows a recursive algorithm that starts
from the root and goes across the MHT until the target leaf is reached
(see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1: Algorithm to calculate the Path of a given certificate.
Input: SNtarget
Output: Path
foreach base-tree and ∆-treei do
if SNtarget ∈ ∆-treei then
k = i
else
k = 0
Nij = rootk;
while Nij .max 6= Nij .min do
i = i− 1
j = 2 · j
if Nij .max < SNtarget then
Path.add(Nij)
j = j + 1
else
Path.add(Ni,j+1)
return Path,k
3. The vehicle verifies that the Hroot (or the H
i
root) calculated from the
Path matches the Hroot (or the Hiroot) contained in the Digestbase (or
the Digest∆i).
Notice that as all Hroot and all Digest are signed by the CA, it is just
as impractical to create falsified values of the Path as it is to break a strong
hash function. In case the certificate is not revoked, the repository sends the
adjacent leaves to the requested certificate. To this respect, the repository has to
prove that a certain certificate (SNtarget) does not belong to the set of revoked
certificates (Φ). To prove that SNtarget /∈ Φ, as the leaves are ordered, it is
enough to demonstrate the existence of two leaves, a minor adjacent (SNminor)
and a major adjacent (SNmajor) for the base-tree and each ∆-tree that fulfill:
1. SNmajor ∈ Φ.
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2. SNminor ∈ Φ.
3. SNminor < SNtarget < SNmajor.
4. SNminor and SNmajor are adjacent nodes.
So in the worst case, where d delta-CRLs have been published, the repository
will have to send 2d+ 1 Paths to proof that a certificate is not revoked, i.e, the
serial number is not contained neither in the base-CRL nor in the delta-CRLs.
Note that in any case, the amount of data necessary to proof that is smaller
than the whole CRL. Therefore, checking vehicles have to know exactly the
number of published ∆-trees, i.e., to check that a certificate is not revoked it
must corroborate that it does not belong to any MHT. In any case, the data
that the repository needs to send to a node to perform the status checking can
be placed in a single UDP datagram using 802.11p link-layer.
4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed status checking pro-
tocol and we compare it with other certificates status management protocols
designed for VANET. First, we define a set of metrics to compare the perfor-
mance of revocation schemes. Then, BECSI is evaluated through simulation
using NCTUns [31]. NCTUns was chosen for its advanced IEEE 802.11 model
library and ability to integrate with any Linux networking tools.
4.1 Comparison Criteria
 Query Cost (Qcost): This criterion measures the cost of certificate validity
checking. The cost represents bandwidth requirement from repositories to
vehicles. Therefore, we calculate this cost as the size of a CSI query (sq)
plus the size of its response (sr):
Qcost = sq + sr. (4)
 Request Ratio: This metric captures the amount of requests that the
VANET entities perform to update the CSI. If client validation requests
arrive independent of each other, an exponential inter-arrival probability
density function can be used to derive the request rate (R) for downloaded
CRLs as in [6]:
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Rt = Nvehλe
λt, (5)
where Nveh is the total number of vehicles in the VANET and λ is the
ratio of certificates validated per day by each vehicle.
 Window of vulnerability (WOV): This criterion captures the risk of op-
erating with cached CSI. It indicates how long the new revocation data
might be held by CAs before being distributed to vehicles. In this paper,
WOV is measured in number of hours, which is reasonable because typi-
cally CRLs are normally updated every day. We estimate the WOV not
only taking into account the validity interval of issued CSI but also the
ratio of unknown revoked certificates during this interval as in [20]. Thus,
WOV (t) =
ρ(t− t0)
(1− ρ)Tc + ρ(t− t0) , (6)
where Tc is the mean certificate lifetime, ρ is the revocation ratio of revoked
certificates, and t0 is the issuing instant of the CSI.
 Scalability : This criterion shows how a revocation mechanism scales in
large VANETs, measured as the ratio of increased costs (in terms of up-
date and query costs) over increased size of the vehicles (measured in the
number of certificates, queries and revoked certificates). If we assume a
stable certificate revocation rate and query rate, a larger VANET typically
indicates more revoked certificates and queries in unit time.
4.2 Analytical Evaluation
In this section, we compare analytically the performance of BECSI to other
certificate status validation mechanisms. To that end, we compare BECSI with
these mechanisms in terms of aforementioned metrics.
4.2.1 Query Cost Analysis
First of all, we start estimating the size of a CRL in a vehicular environment.
Fig. 7 describes the size of each of the elements that compose a CRL. Note
that, in a VANET, the size of the CRL will depend mainly on the number of
revoked certificates, so that the size of the CRL header is negligible compared to
the total size of the CRL. Let Nveh be the total number of vehicles in the region
that the CRL needs to cover, ρ the average percentage of certificates revoked,
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CRL Header (∼ 50 bytes)
 Issuer’s name: 32 bytes (if X.500 name used)
 CRL issuance time (thisUpdate): 6 bytes
 Next CRL issuance time (nextUpdate): 6 bytes
List of revoked certificates (9 bytes per revoked certificate)
 Serial number : 3 bytes
 Revocation date : 6 bytes
 CRL entry extensions (e.g. revocation reason)
CRL general extensions (e.g. CRL Number)
Signature of CRL issuer (64 bytes for ECDSA-256 bit)
Figure 7: Key elements of X.509 v2 CRL
Lf the lifetime of a certificate, and s¯ the mean number of pseudonyms of a
vehicle. Additionally, let Nrev be the number of non-expired certificates that
were revoked, i.e., the number of certificates that the CRL contains. According
to [30], the probability of a certificate being revoked follows an exponential
distribution. Then, the probability of a given certificate to become revoked at
any time period of its lifetime i ∈ [0, . . . , Lf ] can be expressed as:
Prev(i) = Lfe
−i·Lf .
When a certificate is revoked at time period i of its lifetime, it stays in the
CRL for Lf−i time periods. Thus, the expected time a revoked certificate stays
in the CRL can be estimated as:
E(Lf − i) = E(Lf )− E(i) = Lf − 1
Lf
=
L2f − 1
Lf
' Lf .
Then, we can estimate the mean number of revoked certificates in a CRL as:
Nrev = Nveh · ρ · s¯ · Lf .
Finally, we estimate the size of a CRL in a VANET. As shown in Fig.. 7, CRL
entries will have varying sizes, but according to 1609.2 standard [13], 14 bytes
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per entry is a realistic figure, i.e, se = 14 bytes. The size of the CRL header is
negligible compared to the total size of the CRL. According to NIST statistics
[4], 10% of the certificates need to be revoked during a year, i.e., ρ = 0.1. Recall
that in a VANET, each vehicle owes not only an identity certificate, but also
several pseudonyms. The number of pseudonyms may vary depending on the
degree of privacy and anonymity that it must be guaranteed. According to Raya,
Papadimitratos, and Hubaux in [26] the OBU must store enough pseudonyms
to change pseudonyms about every minute while driving. This equates to about
43,800 pseudonyms per year for an average of two hours of driving per day.
Haas, Hu, and Laberteaux in [11] recommend changing pseudonyms every 10
minutes, and driving 15 hours per week. This equates to 4,660 pseudonyms
per year, but they recommend storing five years of pseudonyms for a total of
about 25,000 pseudonyms per OBU. Therefore, we set s¯ = 25, 000. Regarding
to the certificate lifetime, according to [30], it ranges from 26 to 37 days. In this
manner, we set the lifetime to 1 month. Therefore, the expected CRL size is:
CRLsize = Nrev · se = Nveh · ρ · s¯ · Lf · se
Assuming that a regional certification authority manages a very short popu-
lation of around 50,000 vehicles, the expected CRL size is CRLsize ' 145 Mbytes.
On the other hand, the response size of BECSI (when using the MHTs to
generate authenticated responses) is much smaller than a CRL as it consists only
of the Digest and the Path for a given certificate. Using the SHA-1 algorithm
(hash size of 160 bits), and ECDSA-256 the size of the response of BECSI
for 10,000,000 revoked certificates (including pseudonyms) is of approximately
725 bytes.
Mechanism Request size Response size Query Cost
CRL 73 bytes 145 Mbytes ∼145 Mbytes
Compressed CRL (Bloom
Filter-2% false positives)
73 bytes 10 Mbytes ∼10 Mbytes
ADOPT 66 bytes 586 bytes 652 bytes
BECSI tree 73 bytes 725 bytes 778 bytes
Table 1: Comparison of the overhead introduced by BECSI and other certificate
validation mechanisms.
In terms of the total overhead introduced to the network, Table 1 shows the
Query Cost for current proposed certificate validation mechanisms. Note that
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the request size is very similar for all the mechanisms. However, the size of
the response varies significantly, e.g., BECSI and ADOPT response sizes are six
orders of magnitude smaller than conventional CRL. Fig. 8 shows the size of
the response for CRL, Compressed CRL, ADOPT [17] and BECSI depending
on the number of revoked vehicles in the network. While ADOPT response size
is constant, the size of the response when using CRL or a compressed version of
the CRL increments with the number of revoked certificates. Notice that, the
CRL size grows linearly with the number of revoked certificates, while BECSI
response sizes describe a logarithmic growth. Therefore, in terms of Query
Cost, BECSI is more efficient than CRL and the compressed CRL. Regarding
ADOPT, its response size is slightly smaller than in BECSI, but it lacks of the
benefits that BECSI provides to operate during disconnections. ADOPT relies
on the fact that any vehicle stores the previously received CSI responses. In
vehicular scenarios the number of cached responses could be huge, and therefore,
also a huge storage capacity is required in the vehicle. In addition, ADOPT
does not guarantee that a vehicle obtains the status of a given certificate when
needed. So, ADOPT has smaller responses, but it does not provide as fresh
information as BECSI, it forces VANET nodes to store a large amount of CSI
data and finally, it makes the network more vulnerable due to the potential
unavailability of required CSI.
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Figure 8: Response size vs. number of vehicles.
4.2.2 Request Ratio Analysis
In the traditional method of certificate revocation, each CRL includes a nextUp-
date field that specifies the time at which the next CRL will be issued. Thus,
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once a relying party has obtained a CRL in order to perform a validation, it
will not need to request any further information from the repository to perform
future validations until the time specified in the nextUpdate field of the CRL in
its cache has been reached. So, during the period of time in which a CRL is
valid (i.e., the most current), each relying party will make at most one request
to the repository for revocation information. This request will be made the first
time after the current CRL is issued that the relying party performs a valida-
tion. Thus, the request ratio of the CRL decreases during the validity interval
of the CRL following an exponential function (see. Fig. 9). Figure 9 shows the
request rate for a CRL, issued using the traditional method, over the course of
24 hours. The graph in this figure was drawn assuming that a CRL was issued
at time 0 and that no other CRLs were issued during the period of time shown
in the graph. It was also assumed that there are 50,000 vehicles each validating
an average of 10 certificates per day.
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Figure 9: Request rate for different revocation mechanisms.
Figure 9 shows also an example of delta-CRLs issued in the traditional man-
ner. In this example, vehicles download base CRLs at most once every 24 hours.
Delta-CRLs are then obtained to ensure that validations are based on certificate
status information that is at most 1 hour old. Each validation will require access
to a delta-CRL and its corresponding base CRL (either downloaded from the
repository or generated locally from a delta-CRL and a previous base CRL).
So, the request rate for delta-CRLs will be the same as the request rate for full
CRLs in a system that does not use delta-CRLs. Base CRLs, on the other hand,
will be downloaded less frequently.
Finally, regarding the cases of BECSI and ADOPT, the request rate is almost
constant, i.e., every time a vehicle needs to check the status of a particular
certificate they must query a repository. Note that this rate decreases with
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time, as vehicles also have the ability to store previously queried CSI. However,
as the number of valid certificates is so large in VANETs, this decrement is
imperceptible.
4.2.3 WOV Analysis
The window of vulnerability (WOV) affects update and query bandwidth re-
quirements and/or repositories processing loads directly, while these two factors
are two major features determining scalability of CSI issuing mechanisms. WOV
presents a direct tradeoff between the security/ timeliness and system scalability.
No window of vulnerability means high security and is thus desirable; however,
it requires either timely certificate status update from CAs that can force a high
update cost and incur security risk.
The traditional way of issuing CRL is the worst mechanism in terms of WOV.
During the whole validity of the CRL, vehicles are unaware of new revoked
certificates. Therefore, the WOV will increase during the validity of the CRL
as there will be more unknown revoked certificates as times goes by. Figure 10
shows the WOV for a CRL issued periodically each 24 hours, and with a constant
revocation rate ρ = 0.1. Note that the revocation rate determines the slope of
the function, i.e., higher revocation rate will give higher WOV.
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Figure 10: WOV for different revocation mechanisms.
Compressed CRLs have the same WOV that the standard CRL as they are
just a compressed version of the CRL issued with the same lifetime. In the
same way, ADOPT also has the same WOV that a CRL. ADOPT presents a
distributed mechanism that takes advantages of V2V communications to issue
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cached CSI. However, the CSI source of this cached revocation information is a
CRL. Therefore, the validity period of the cached information in ADOPT is the
same that the validity period of the source CRL, i.e., the WOV is the same.
Figure 10 also shows the WOV for BECSI and delta-CRLs. Note that both
mechanisms improve the WOV. Traditional delta-CRLs reduce the WOV as
they are issued periodically during the validity of the base-CRL. Therefore, the
interval of vulnerability of the base-CRL is reduced as many times as delta-
CRLs are issued during the lifetime of the base-CRL. In the example shown
in the figure, for each base-CRL issued each day, a delta-CRL is issued each
2.4 hours. Thus, 10 delta-CRLs are issued during the validity interval of the
base-CRL, reducing the WOV ten times.
In the same way, BECSI also uses delta-CRLs to construct the tree structure.
Therefore, the tree structures used in such scheme reduces not only update
or query costs, but also the WOV. Recall that BECSI does not issue delta-
CRLs periodically, but these are issued with a fixed size. In this sense, despite
that fact that the WOV could be higher than with the traditional delta-CRL
issuing mechanism, the maximum WOV is always constant. Thus CAs can
manage the WOV by selecting the size of the delta-CRLs. In the example
shown in the figure 10, the number of delta-CRLs issued during the validity
interval of the base-CRL is reduced compared to the traditional delta-CRL
issuing mechanisms. Note that in this example, BECSI’s WOV is never higher
than 0.0005.
4.2.4 Scalability Analysis
When the vehicular population is large, CRLs tend to become large imposing
high bandwidth costs on the CRL distribution points. Hence traditional CRL-
based schemes do not scale well. If clients have limited bandwidth capability as
is the case of the 802.11p, downloading large CRLs will be user-unfriendly.
With traditional delta-CRLs, the base-CRLs are issued less frequently (as
shown in Fig. 5), this reducing the total bandwidth load on the CRL distribu-
tion points. However, that use of the traditional delta-CRL does not lead to
a significant reduction in bandwidth as one would expect. If delta-CRLs are
issued very frequently, there is no advantage in using traditional delta-CRLs.
Therefore, although the scalability improves compared to simple CRLs mecha-
nisms, traditional delta-CRLs scalability depends on the issuing periodicity of
the delta-CRLs.
BECSI takes advantage of the delta-CRLs and optimize the issuing interval
so that delta-CRLs remain constant in size. With BECSI, delta-CRLs always
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have the same size, but they are issued aperiodically. Thus, BECSI becomes
more scalable than traditional delta-CRL where depending on the revocation
rate the issuing period of the delta-CRLs could be bandwidth-inefficient. More-
over, BECSI also takes advantage of the capabilities of the V2V communication,
allowing any vehicle in the network to become a mobile repository. In this sense,
BECSI (as ADOPT), multiplies the number of potential repositories, and, there-
fore, its scalability is also increased.
4.3 Simulation
In the previous section, we have seen analytically that BECSI mechanisms out-
perform CRL in terms of Query Cost, WOV and scalability. Moreover, BECSI
also improves other revocation mechanisms such as ADOPT when analyzing the
availability of fresh CSI. In this section, we evaluate the proposed mechanism
in a VANET scenario taking into account the specific characteristics of these
networks. Using the simulator NCTUns [31], BECSI is evaluated.
Figure 11: Simulation scenario.
The reference scenario is shown in Figure 11. This scenario consists of 4
two-lane roads forming a 1000x500m rectangle. Three RSUs are placed every
300 meters. Note that there are some areas of the highway that are not covered.
Table 2 summarizes the values of the configuration parameters used in the
reference scenario. Note that we have configured our simulation to use the Nak-
agami propagation model. We choose this propagation model because empirical
research studies have shown that a fading radio propagation model, such as the
Nakagami model, is best for simulation of a vehicular environment [29].
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Parameter Value
Area 1000x500m
Number of RSUs 3
Number of OBUs 100
RSU Transmission range 300m
MAC IEEE 802.11p
Propagation model Nakagami
Number of caching nodes 20
Maximum speed 120 km/h
Table 2: Parameter values for the reference scenario.
Using this scenario as reference, firstly, we compare the CSI validation delay
of the BECSI scheme with that of the classical PKI [13] under a well-deployed
VANET. In the conducted simulation, we consider the cryptography delay only
due to hashing operations and point multiplication operations on an elliptic
curve, as they are the most time-consuming operations in the proposed proto-
col. Let Thash and Tmul denote the time required to perform a pairing operation
and a point multiplication, respectively, respectively. Elliptic curve digital sig-
nature algorithm is the digital signature method chosen by the VANET standard
IEEE1609.2, where a certificate and signature verification takes 4Tmul, and a
signature generation takes Tmul. To verify a credential in the basic scheme de-
scribed in Section 3.4.4, a vehicles must perform a hash operation to compute
the current contents of leaf node in the BECSI-tree corresponding to SNi. Fi-
nally, it performs logN hash operations to compute the root of the BECSI-tree
using the Path. Therefore, the total computation overhead when checking the
status of a certificate is Thash(logN + 1) + 4Tmul. In [36], Tmul are found for
an MNT curve with embedding degree k = 6 that is equal to 0.6 ms. In our
simulation, we use an Intel Core i7 950 (at 3.07GHz) which is able to perform
1015952 SHA-1 Hashes per second, i.e, Thash = 0, 98µs. Therfore the expected
time to check the validity of a Path in BECSI with is 2.4 ms.
In VANETs, the most important issue in any revocation method is the delay
of delivering the CSI to the vehicles to prevent that misbehaving vehicles from
jeopardizing the safety of its neighbors. Consequently, we measure the revoca-
tion delay as delay from the moment a vehicle issues a CSI request until the
moment the new CSI is received. Table 3 shows the average time spent by a
vehicle to retrieve CSI from a repository.
It is worth noting that the worst mechanisms in terms of delay are the
traditional CRL and delta-CRL as requesting entities are downloading all the
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Revocation Mechanism Average Time Standard Deviation
CRL (300 KB) 2,23 min 0,51 min
Compressed-CRL (20 KB) 7,01 sec 1,12 sec
Traditional Delta CRL (2.5-15 KB) 4,47 sec 2,12 sec
ADOPT (652 B) 705,06 ms 200,81 ms
BECSI Delta CRL (8 KB) 6,02 sec 0,05 sec
BECSI MHT (778 B-912 B) 483,02 ms 20,31 ms
Table 3: Time required to retrieve CSI.
available CSI. However, the delay of the conventional CRL compared with the
proposed BECSI protocol decreases with the number of CSI requests. The
variations in time to download the CRL are due to the number of intermediate
RSUs existing in the connection between the CA and the vehicle sending the
revocation request. The average time to validate the status of a certificate in
ADOPT is lower than BECSI because of the number of hops that are necessary
to retrieve the cached CSI. BECSI in its MHT mode of operation is the fastest
in average when validating the status of a certificate. However, this mode of
operation has a also a notable deviation. While in ADOPT the high deviation is
due to the number of hops, in BECSI this deviation is mainly due to the number
of ∆-trees that a vehicle has to check when a certificate is not revoked. Note
also, that there are also some deviations from the theoretical expected results.
This is due to several reasons such as the non-uniform distribution of the mobile
repositories, the distance to the repositories or the congestion of the channel.
Figure 12 shows the number of vehicles that are able to download the CSI in a
particular range time depending on the revocation mechanisms. As expected,
with BECSI and ADOPT almost all the 100 vehicles are able to download
and process the CSI in less than 1,5 seconds. However, with Delta-CRLs and
compressed-CRLs it takes from 4 to 8 seconds to retrieve the CSI.
Finally, we also evaluate the overhead introduced by BECSI. BECSI intro-
duces overhead due to the transmission of the value of the hash chain in the
control channel. To evaluate this in the CCH channel, we configure the RSUs
to transmit this message every second. As expected, the vehicle is receiving
messages from the RSU in range every 100 ms; and every second it receives the
message M that involves an increase of the incoming throughput of 72 bytes.
In this sense, the overhead introduced by the BECSI mechanism is 4% of the
toal capacity of the CCH channel.
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Figure 12: Histogram plot of time delay of the vehicles that receive the CSI
depending on the revocation mechanism.
5 Conclusions
The revocation service is critical to permit efficient authentication in VANETs.
Decentralized approaches based on reputation and voting schemes provide mech-
anisms for revocation management inside the VANET. However, the local va-
lidity of the CSI and the lack of support for extending its validity to the global
VANET restrain their utilization in the real scenarios. The IEEE 1609.2 stan-
dard suggest the use of CRLs to manage the revocation data. However, the
tradicional way of issuing CRLs do not fit well in a VANET where huge number
of nodes are involved and where several pseudonym certificates are assigned in
addition to vehicle identity certificates.
In this paper, we have presented BECSI, a bandwidth efficient certificate
status checking mechanism based on the use of a hybrid delta-CRL scheme and
MHTs. BECSI introduces an extension to both base-CRL and delta-CRL allow-
ing any non-TTP to act as repository. The main advantage of this extended-CRL
and extended-delta-CRL is that the road-side units and vehicles can build an
efficient structure based on an authenticated hash tree to respond to status
checking requests inside the VANET, saving time and bandwidth. Thus, vehi-
cles do not have to download the whole CRL but query for the status of the
certificate they need to operate with. Moreover, as extended-delta-CRLs have
a fixed size, BECSI avoids the traditional problem of optimizing the validity
windows of delta-CRLs. Thus, the risk of operating with unknown revoked cer-
tificates remains constant during the validity interval of the base-CRL, and CAs
have the ability to manage this risk by setting the size of the delta-CRLs.
Analytical and simulation results show that allocating a small bandwidth is
enough to ensure that vehicles receive CSI responses within few seconds. The
performance improvement is obtained at expenses of adding the signed hash tree
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extension to the standard-CRL. BECSI evaluation shows that not only improves
in terms of bandwidth but also in terms of scalability (increase in the number of
available repositories) and vulnerability (controlled WOV). In this way, BECSI
becomes an oﬄine certificate status validation mechanism as it does not need
trusted responders to operate. Therefore, BECSI significantly achieves great
efficiency and scalability, especially when deployed in heterogeneous vehicular
networks.
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Abstract. Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) require some mech-
anism to authenticate messages, identify valid vehicles, and remove mis-
behaving ones. A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can provide this func-
tionality using digital certificates, but needs an efficient mechanism to
revoked misbehaving/compromised vehicles. The IEEE 1609.2 standard
states that VANETs will rely on the use of certificate revocation lists
(CRLs) to achieve revocation. However, despite their simplicity, CRLs
present two major disadvantages that are highlighted in a vehicular net-
work: CRL size and CRL request implosion. In this paper, we point out
the problems when using CRLs in this type of networks. To palliate these
issues, we propose the use of Authenticated Data Structures (ADS) that
allow distributing efficiently revocation data. By using ADS, network en-
tities can check the status of a certificate decreasing the peak bandwidth
load in the distribution points.
Keywords: Certification, PKI, Authenticated Data Structures.
1 Introduction
In the last decade, wireless communication between vehicles have drawn
extensive attention for their promise to contribute to a safer, more effi-
cient, and more comfortable driving experience in the foreseeable future.
This type of communications have stimulated the emergence of Vehicu-
lar ad hoc networks (VANETs) which consist of mobile nodes capable
of communicating with each other (i.e. Vehicle to Vehicle Communica-
tion -V2V communication) and with the static infrastructure (i.e. Ve-
hicle to Infrastructure Communication -V2I communication). To make
these communications feasible, vehicles are equipped with on-board units
(OBUs) and fixed communication units (road-side units, RSUs) are placed
?? This work is funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Education under the
projects CONSOLIDER-ARES (CSD2007-00004) and TEC2011-26452 ”SERVET“,
and by the Government of Catalonia under grant 2009 SGR 1362.
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along the road. Applying short range wireless technology based on IEEE
802.11, multi-hop communication facilitates information exchange among
network nodes that are not in direct communication range [1].
However, the open-medium nature of these networks and the high-
speed mobility of a large number of vehicles make necessary the integra-
tion of primary security requirements such as authentication, message in-
tegrity, non-repudiation, and privacy [2]. Without security, all users would
be potentially vulnerable to the misbehavior of the services provided by
the VANET. Hence, it is necessary to evict compromised, defective, and
illegitimate nodes. The basic solution envisioned to achieve these require-
ments is to use digital certificates linked to a user by a trusted third party.
These certificates can then be used to sign information. Most of the exist-
ing solutions manage these certificates by means of a central Certification
Authority (CA) [3]. According to IEEE 1609.2 standard [4], vehicular net-
works will rely on the public key infrastructure (PKI). In PKI, a CA issues
an authentic digital certificate for each node in the network. Therefore, an
efficient certificate management is crucial for the robust and reliable op-
eration of any PKI. A critical part of any certificate-management scheme
is the revocation of certificates.
Regarding the revocation of these certificates, some proposals allow
revocation without the intervention of the infrastructure at the expense
of trusting other vehicles criteria; and other proposals are based on the
existence of a central entity, such as the CA, which is in charge of taking
the revocation decision for a certain vehicle. Again, according to the IEEE
1609.2 standard [4], vehicular networks will rely on the existence of a CA.
In this sense, it is stated that these networks will depend on certificate
revocation lists (CRLs) and short-lived certificates to achieve revocation.
CRLs can be seen as black lists that enumerate revoked certificates along
with the date of revocation and, optionally, the reasons for revocation.
As the network scale of VANETs is expected to be very large and
to protect the privacy of users each vehicle has many temporary certifi-
cates (or called pseudonyms), the CRLs are expected to be quite large.
Moreover, CRLs have also associated a problem of request implosion, i.e.,
vehicles may become synchronized around CRL publication instant, as
they may request CRL at or near the moment of publication. This burst
of requests may cause network congestion that may introduce longer la-
tency in the process of validating a certificate. To reduce the potential
network and computational overhead imposed by any CRL distribution
mechanism, some optimizations for organizing, storing, and exchanging
CRL information have been proposed. In [2, 5], it is proposed a way of
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compress CRLs using Bloom filters. Their method reduces the size of a
CRL by using about half the number of bytes to specify the certificate
serial number for revocation. However, the use of this probabilistic struc-
ture has associated a false positive rate that diminishes the efficiency of
the revocation service.
In this paper, we explore the benefits of using authenticated data
structures (ADS), such as binary trees or skip lists, to manage revocation
data in VANETS. These structures are a model of computation where
untrusted responders answer certificate status queries on behalf of the CA
and provide a proof of the validity of the answer to the user. Although
VANETs can greatly benefit from the use of ADSs, to the best of our
knowledge there has been no proposal of deploying the revocation service
by means of an ADS. By using these structures, both CRL issues are
palliated: the CA is no longer a bottleneck as there are several responders
that act on its behalf; and the revocation data can be checked without
downloading the whole CRL.
2 CRLs’ problematic in VANETs
As stated in the trial-use standard [4], for a certificate authority (CA)
to invalidate a vehicle’s certificates, the CA includes the certificate serial
number in the CRL. The CA then distributes the CRL so that vehicles can
identify and distrust the newly revoked vehicle. The distribution should
spread quickly to every vehicle in the system.
However, the distribution itself poses a great challenge due to the
size of the CRL. As a CRL is a list containing the serial numbers of
all certificates issued by a given certification authority (CA) that have
been revoked and have not yet expired, its distribution causes network
overhead. Moreover, the CRL size increases dramatically if only a small
portion of the OBUs in the VANET is revoked. To have an idea of how big
the CRL size can be, consider the case where 1% of the total number of
the OBUs in the United States is revoked. Recall that in a VANET, each
vehicle owes not only an identity certificate, but also several pseudonyms.
The number of pseudonyms may vary depending on the degree of privacy
and anonymity that it must be guaranteed. According to Raya, Papadim-
itratos, and Hubaux in [5] the OBU must store enough pseudonyms to
change pseudonyms about every minute while driving. This equates to
about 43,800 pseudonyms per year for an average of two hours of driving
per day. In the United States alone, 255,917,664 ”highway” registered ve-
hicles were counted in 2008, of which 137,079,843 passenger cars [6]. In
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this case, the CRL would contain around 100 billion revoked certificates.
Assuming that certificates can be identified by a 16 byte fingerprint (the
size of one AES block), the CRL size would be of 1,7 TB approximately.
Only the amount of memory necessary to storage this CRL makes it im-
possible its deployment. Therefore, the CRL size has to be reduced.
The CRL size can be reduced by using regional CAs. However, there
appears a trade-off between the size of the CA region and size of the
CRL, as well as the management complexity of the entire PKI system
for VANETs. The least complicated region to manage would be a single
large area, such as the entire United States, with a single CA responsible
for every certificate and pseudonym. However, this gives place to CRLs of
several terabytes. Therefore, it is necessary to divide the CRL information
according to regional areas. In this sense, if we divide the entire United
States by cities (i.e. 10,016 cities according to the U.S. census bureau),
the CRL size is reduced to around 170 Mbytes. Using the 802.11a pro-
tocol to communicate with RSUs in range, vehicles could have between
10-30 Mbps depending on the vehicle’s speed and the road congestion.
Therefore, in the best case a vehicle will need more than 45 seconds to
download the whole CRL. Under non-congested conditions, any vehicle
should be able to contact the infrastructure for more than 45 seconds,
and therefore download the CRL. In scenarios where vehicles are not able
to keep a permanent link with the infrastructure for this amount of time,
techniques such as Bloom filter or Digital Fountain Codes could be used
to download the CRL. Therefore, though the problem of having a huge
CRL is mitigated by the use of such techniques, the restraints imposed
by the distribution affect the freshness of the revocation data.
A direct consequence of this significant time to download a CRL is that
a new CRL cannot be issued very often, so its validity period has to be
shortened. This validity period directly determines how often a vehicle has
to update the revocation information. Therefore, the validity period of the
CRL is critical to the bandwidth consumption. In this context, it appears
another trade-off between the freshness of revocation information and the
bandwidth consumed by downloading CRLs. Large validity periods will
decrease the network overhead at expenses of having outdated revocation
information. Small validity periods will increase the network overhead
but users will have fresh information about revoked certificates. As CRLs
cannot be issued every time there is a new revoked certificate, vehicles
will be operating with revocation information that is not comprehensive.
Therefore, they will be taking certain risk of trusting a certificate that
could be potentially revoked.
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3 Using Authenticated Data Structures for certificate
revocation in VANETs
By replicating revocation data at untrusted responders near users, VANETs
can enhance its performance but that replication causes a major security
challenge. Namely, how can a vehicle verify that the revocation data repli-
cated at the RSUs are the same as the original from the CA? A simple
mechanism to achieve the authentication of replicated revocation data
consists of having the digitally sign each revocation entry and replicating
the CA signature too. However, in VANETs where the revocation data
evolves rapidly over time, this solution is inefficient. To achieve higher
communication and computation efficiency, we propose the use of au-
thenticated data structures (ADS) to handle the revocation service in
VANETs. ADSs are a model of computation where untrusted responders
answer certificate status queries on behalf of the CA and provide a proof
of the validity of the answer to the user. In this section, first we introduce
the architecture necessary to adopt ADSs. Then, we describe different
ADSs and their main benefits.
3.1 System Architecture
Certification 
Authority 
(CA)
RSU
RSU
Roadside 
Unit (RSU)
On-Board 
Unit (OBU)
Fig. 1. System Architecture.
The system architecture to support ADSs consists in an adaptation
of a PKI system to the vehicular environment. The ADS model involves
a structured collection R of revoked certificates and three parties: the
certification authority (CA), the road side units (RSUs), and the vehi-
cles. A repertory of query operations and optional update operations are
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assumed to be defined over R. These three parties present a hierarchical
architecture (see Fig. 1) which consists of three levels: the CA is located
at level 1, as it is the top of the system. RSUs are located at level 2.
Finally, the on-board units (OBUs) are located at the bottom of the hier-
archy. Note that without loss of generality we consider a single the central
trusted authority at the root, but it could be further divided into differ-
ent state level trusted authorities and additionally a group of city level
trusted authorities can be placed under every state authority.
The main tasks of each entity are:
1. The CA is responsible for generating the set of certificates that are
stored in each OBU. It is also responsible for holding the original
version of R and making it accessible to the rest of the entities. By
definition of TTP, the CA should be considered fully trusted by all
the network entities, so it should be assumed that it cannot be com-
promised by any attacker. In fact, in our proposal the CA is the only
trusted entity within the network. Whenever an update is performed
on R, the CA produces structure authentication information, which
consists of a signed time-stamped statement about the current version
of R.
2. RSUs are fixed entities that are fully controlled by the CA. They can
access the CA anytime because they are located in the infrastructure-
side, which does not suffer from disconnections. RSUs maintain a copy
ofR. They interact with the CA by receiving from the CA the updates
performed on R together with the associated structure authentication
information. RSUs also interact with vehicles by answering queries on
R posed by the vehicles. In addition to the answer to a query, RSUs
also return answer authentication information, which consists of (i)
the freshest structure authentication information issued by the CA;
and (ii) a proof of the authenticity of the answer. If the CA considers
that an RSU has been compromised, the CA can revoke it.
3. OBUs are in charge of storing all the certificates that a vehicle pos-
sesses. An OBU has abundant resources in computation and storage
and allows any vehicle to communicate with the infrastructure and
with any other vehicle in its neighborhood. OBUs pose queries on
R, but instead of contacting the CA directly, it contacts the RSU
in range. However, OBUs only trust the CA and not the RSU about
R. Hence, it verifies the answer from the RSU using the associated
answer authentication information.
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3.2 System Requirements
– Low computational cost : The computations performed internally by
each entity (CA, RSU, and OBU) should be simple and fast.
– Low communication overhead : CA-to-RSU communication (update
authentication information) and RSU-to-OBU communication (an-
swer authentication information) should be as small as possible.
– High security : the authenticity of the answers given by a RSU should
be verifiable.
3.3 Authenticated Data Structures
Several ADSs have been proposed in the literature (mainly in the context
of data base management) that fulfill the aforementioned requirements.
In this section, we describe a repertoire of ADSs and to what extent they
are capable of improving the revocation service.
Merkle Hash trees A Merkle hash tree (MHT) [7] is essentially a tree
structure that is built with a collision-resistant hash function to produce a
short cryptographic description of R. The leaf nodes hold the hash values
of the data of interest, i.e., the serial number of the revoked certificates
(SN1,SN2,. . .,SNn); and the internal nodes hold the hash values that
result from applying the hash function to the concatenation of the hash
values of its children nodes. In this way, a large number of separate data
can be tied to a single hash value: the hash at the root node of the tree.
MHTs can be used to provide an efficient and highly-scalable way to
distribute revocation information.
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00H 01H 02H 03H
20H
20 10 11( | )rootH H h H H 
010 0 01( | )H H Hh 011 2 03( | )H H Hh
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Fig. 2. Sample trees (a) MHT (b) 2-3.
A sample MHT is presented in Figure 2(a). The authentication of
an element is performed using a verification path, which consists of the
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sibling nodes of the nodes on the path from the leaf associated with the
element to the root of the tree. The root value is signed and the collision-
resistant property of the hash function is used to propagate authentication
from the root to the leaves. This construction is simple and efficient and
achieves signature amortization, where only one digital signature is used
for signing a large collection of data. The hash tree uses linear space and
has O(log n) (where n denotes the number of revoked certificates) proof
size, query time and verification time. An ADS based on hash trees can
also achieve O(log n) update time.
2-3 trees A standard 2-3 tree [8] is a tree where all leaves are at the
same height and each node (except leaves) has two or three children. It has
the nice property that leaf removal and insertion incur only logarithmic
complexity because these operations only involve the nodes related to the
path from the relevant leaf to the root.
Each leaf of such a 2-3 tree stores an element of set R, and each in-
ternal node stores a one-way hash of its children’s values. Thus, the CA-
to-RSU communication is reduced to O(1) entries, since the CA sends
insert and remove instructions to the RSUs, together with a signed mes-
sage consisting of a timestamp and the hash value of the root of the tree.
RSUs respond to a membership query for an element SNi as follows: if
SNi is in R, then RSUs provide the path from the leaf storing SNi to the
root, together with all the siblings of the nodes on this path; else (SNi is
not inR), RSUs provide the leaf-to-root paths from two consecutive leaves
storing SNj and SNk such that j < i < k, together with all siblings of the
nodes on these paths. By tracing these paths, OBUs can recompute the
hash values of their nodes, ultimately recomputing the hash value for the
root, which is then compared against the signed hash value of the root for
authentication. As with MHTs, these trees achieve O(log n) proof size,
query time, update time and verification time.
One-way accumulator One-way accumulator (OWA) functions [9] al-
low a CA to digitally sign a collection of objects as opposed to a single
one. The main advantage of this approach is that the validation of a re-
sponse takes constant time and requires computations simple enough to
be performed in resource-constrained devices. This type of ADS achieves
a tradeoff between the cost of updates at the CA and queries at the RSUs,
with updates taking O(k + log(nk )) time and queries taking O(
n
k ) time,
for any fixed integer parameter 1 ≤ k ≤ n. For instance, one can achieve
O(
√
n) time for both updates and queries.
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Skip Lists Skip lists [10] are probabilistic ADSs that provide an alter-
native to balanced tree. Skip lists are sorted linked lists with extra links,
designed to allow fast search in R by taking “shortcuts“. The main idea
is to enhance linked lists, which connect each element in the data se-
quence to its successor, by also connecting some elements to successors
further down the sequence. Roughly half of the elements have links to
their two-hop successor, roughly a quarter of the elements have links to
their four-hop successor, and so on. As a result, during traversal from
SNi to element SNj , the traversal path follows repeatedly the longest
available link from the current element that does not overshoot the des-
tination SNj , and thereby reaches SNj in fewer steps than would be
possible by just traversing every intervening element between SNi and
SNj . Compared with balanced trees, a skip list presents the following
benefits:
– It is easy to implement and practically efficient in search, especially
update time.
– It is space compact, where space is allocated when needed, while
empty space is preserved in balanced tree.
– It is main memory index, while balanced tree are disk-based index.
Finally, Table 1 shows a comparison of the asymptotic performance
of the main ADS versus traditional revocation mechanisms such as CRL
or OCSP. Note that with ADSs, the revocation service can be greatly
improved both in computation and communication overhead.
method space update time update size query time query size verifying time
CRL O(n) O(1) O(1) O(n) O(n) O(n)
OCSP O(n) O(n) O(n) O(1) O(1) O(1)
MHT O(n) O(log n) O(1) O(log n) O(log n) O(log n)
2-3 tree O(n) O(log n) O(1) O(log n) O(log n) O(log n)
Skip Lists O(n) O(log n) O(1) O(log n) O(log n) O(log n)
OWA O(n) O(k + log(n
k
)) O(k) O(n
k
) O(1) O(1)
Table 1. Comparison of the main ADS vs traditional revocation mechanisms.
3.4 Certificate Status Validation Protocol
The certificate status validation protocol consists in three stages.
1. Revocation Service Setup: The CA creates a CRL by appending the
serial number of any revoked certificate. Then, it computes the corre-
sponding ADS from the set R of revoked certificates contained in the
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CRL. Once the ADS is computed, the CA signs the resulting time-
stamped digest of the data structure, i.e., a collision resistant succinct
representation of the data structure. The digest is transmitted to all
the RSUs via a secure wireline together with the corresponding CRL.
RSUs can either implement a push or pull protocol to transmit the
digest to the vehicles in range.
2. Certificate Status Updating : Depending on the CA’s policy, when an
update is necessary, the CA recomputes the ADS and generates a new
signed digest that is transmitted to the RSUs. Note that depending
on the ADS, the data structure should be computed again or only
update and delete operations should be performed. The new ADS is
transmitted to the RSUs again, so that they could answer to validation
queries.
3. Certificate Status Querying : OBUs query any RSU in range about
the status of a particular certificate (SNi). If SNi ∈ R, then the
RSU computes the path necessary to allow OBUs to compute the
digest and check that it matches the signed digest. If SNi /∈ R, then
the RSU computes the path of two consecutive certificates in R and
transmit them to the requesting OBU. This OBU can then recompute
the digest for both revoked certificates and be sure that SNi /∈ R.
4 Evaluation
In the following, we compare the communication costs of using ADSs with
the tradition CRL mechanism. To that end we define a set of parameters
(see Table 2).
Parameter Meaning of the parameter
N Total number of certificates (n = 3, 000, 000)
k Average number of certificates handled by a CA (k = 30, 000)
p Percentage of revoked certificates(p = 0.1)
q Number of certificate status queries issued per day (q = 3, 000, 000)
T Number of updates per day (T = 1)
sSN Size of a serial number (sSN = 20)
ssig Size of a signature (ssig = 1, 000)
shash Size of the hash function (shash = 128).
Table 2. Notation
Using this notation, the CRL daily update cost is T · n · p · sSN as
each CA sends the whole CRL to the corresponding RSUs in each update.
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The CRL daily query cost is q · p · k · sSN as for every query the RSU
sends the whole CRL to the querying OBU. When using ADS, these costs
are drastically reduced. Note that no matter the type of ADS, OBUs do
not have to download the whole CRL, and they only download status
information about the certificate they want to operate with. Regarding
MHTs, the RSUs have to recompute the tree in each update, so that
daily update cost is T · n · p · sSN . However, to answer an OBU’s query
the RSU only needs to send up to 1 + log2(pk) numbers, resulting in
q ·shash(1+log2(pk)) bits. In the case of 2-3 trees, to update the directory,
the CA sends difference lists of total daily length of n·p·sSN365 +T · ssig; and
answer to OBUs’ queries results in 2 · q · shash · log2(pk) bits. Similarly,
skip lists need 2log2dpke number to answer an OBU’s query and the
same update cost than the 2-3 tree. With OWAs, the size of answer are
drastically reduced to roughly ssig, and the update cost depends on the
accumulator configuration. We use Matlab R2011b to evaluate these costs.
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Fig. 3. (a) Daily CA-to-RSU update costs vs. update rate, (b) RSU-to-OBU query
cost vs query rate.
Note that the costs will vary mainly depending on the total num-
ber of revoked certificates, the update rate and the number of queries.
Figure 3(a) shows how the CA-to-RSU update communication costs of
the different revocation mechanisms depend on the update rate (all other
parameters are held constant). Note that any ADS is much more robust
and efficient than CRL, even allowing once per hour updates. Regarding
the query costs, as ADSs have smaller proof to validate the status of a
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certificate they provide a more bandwidth efficient solution than CRL
(see Fig. 3(b)).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider the problem of certificate authentication and
revocation in VANETs. We have proposed the use of authenticated data
structures to handle the revocation service over VANETs. After discussing
the issues of deploying CRLs in these environments, we show that ADSs
are more robust to changes in parameters, and allow higher update/query
rates than traditional revocation mechanisms. In addition, the adoption
ADS reduces both the communication and the computational overhead
in the OBUs. For our future work, we will investigate the use of mobile
repositories under the context of the proposed schemes.
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Abstract. The ability to communicate securely is needed for many network
applications. Public key infrastructure (PKI) is the most extended solution
to verify and confirm the identity of each party involved in any secure trans-
action and transfer trust over the network. One of the hardest tasks of a
certification infrastructure is to manage revocation. Research on this topic
has focused on the trade-offs that different revocation mechanisms offer. How-
ever, less effort has been paid to understand the benefits of improving the
revocation policies. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the oligopoly
of certificate providers that issue digital certificates to clients facing identi-
cal independent risks. We found the prices in the equilibrium, and we proof
that certificate providers that offer better revocation information are able to
impose higher prices to their certificates without sacrificing market share in
favor of the other oligarchs. In addition, we show that our model is able to
explain the actual tendency of the SSL market where providers with worst
QoS are suffering loses.
Keywords: PKI pricing, SSL certificates, CRLs.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, there is a wide range of technology, products and solutions for se-
curing electronic infrastructures. As with physical access security, the levels
of security implemented should be commensurate with the level of complex-
ity, the applications in use, the data in play, and the measurement of the
overall risk at stake. A consensus has emerged among technical experts and
information managers in government and industry that Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) offers the best feasible solution to these issues. PKI [1] has
been a popular, yet often reviled technology since its adoption in the early
nineties.
Currently deployed PKIs rely mostly on Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs) for handling certificate revocation [2]. Although CRLs are the most
widely used way of distributing certificate status information, much research
?? This work is funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Education under the projects
CONSOLIDER-ARES (CSD2007-00004), FPU grant AP2010-0244, and TEC2011-26452
”SERVET“, and by the Government of Catalonia under grant 2009 SGR 1362.
134
effort has been put on studying other revocation distribution mechanisms in
a variety of scenarios [3, 4]. These studies aim to compare the performance of
different revocation mechanisms in different scenarios. However, none of these
studies have explicitly modeled the interaction among CAs. In this paper, we
model this interaction by using a game-theoretic approach.
With the appearance of novel network environments (e.g VANET or
MANET), the quantity of CAs in the SSL certificate market is becoming
larger and the market concentration diminishes, but it is not simple to elimi-
nate the oligopoly in the short-term. During the 90s, the certification market,
the competition among CAs appears mainly as price competition. In this sit-
uation, malignant price competition would be detrimental to the interests of
the users and lead to the CA’s pay crisis. Facing the situation, the main CAs
have begun to change the competitive strategies from basic price competition
to price and quality of services (QoS) competition. To provide better QoS,
CAs have to improve their revocation service, and specifically the freshness of
the CRLs. Users will pay more for a service that issues certificate status infor-
mation faster. Time-to-revocation metric is visible to costumers by checking
the CA’s repositories where they publicize the revocation information.
The model of this article deals with an oligopoly of CAs which compete
in certificate prices and QoS, and do not know the certificate revocation
probability in the next interval for sure. The assumption that the revocation
probability is ex-ante uncertain is quite logical and intuitive. The number of
revoked certificates vary with time and in a manner that cannot predictable
with certainty. We show that an uncertain revocation probability introduces
a systematic risk that does not decrease by selling more certificates. If CAs
are risk averse, this effect relaxes price competition. The equilibrium charac-
teristic of the certification market is found by establishing a price competi-
tion model with different QoS. We consider that there are diversities in the
certification service quality, and we describe factors that affect the service
quality such as the CRL lifetime. By combining the characteristics of the
certification market and considering the conveniences of modeling, two key
parameters are selected to measure the QoS and a duopoly price competition
model with service quality differentiation is established.
2 Related Work
Although PKI has been a widely adopted solution for many years now, very
few works have dealt with the impact of the revocation mechanism in the
prices CAs offer. Most of the literature [4, 5], intend to optimize the revocation
mechanism to minimize the overhead or to improve the reliability. However,
the most extended revocation mechanism is still CRL. Authors in [6] analyze
the revocation mechanisms based on based on empirical data from a local
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network. They conclude that the freshness of the revocation data depends
on how often the end entities retrieve the revocation information but the
bandwidth cost is high if end entities retrieve the revocation lists often.
Ma et al. in [7] propose a series of policies that certification authorities
should follow when releasing revocation information. According to this study,
a CA should take different strategies when providing certificate services for a
new type of certificates versus a re-serving type of certificates. Authors give
the steps by which a CA can derive optimal CRL releasing strategies and
they prove that a CA should release CRLs less frequently in the case that
the fixed cost is higher, the variable cost is higher, the liability cost is lower,
or the issued age of certificates is shorter. Similarly authors in [8] authors
address the CRL release problem through a systematic and rigorous approach
which relies on a mix of empirical estimation and analytical modeling. They
propose four different models which seek to exploit the variation in certificate
specific properties to provide guidance to the CA in determining the optimal
CRL release intervals and the associated costs. However, none of these works
neither analyze the impact of CRLs releasing policies in the prices that the
CA charges nor model the interaction among CAs. In this paper, we address
these issues using a game theoretic approach.
3 Modeling the Certificate Provider Competition
To formalize our arguments we describe a model of the certificate market
with profit-maximizing certification authorities and a continuum of network
users. When a user requests the status of given certificate, the CA does not
always provides the most updated information but a pre-signed CRL [4, 5].
In this context, the CA will bear the liability cost due to any damage that
may occur between the revocation of a certificate and the release of the CRL.
3.1 Demand for certificates
We consider an oligopoly of A CAs, indexed by i = 1, · · · , A − 1, and N
users in the economy, where N is large relative to A.Each user has the same
strictly concave expected utility function and faces the risk to lose l when
using a revoked certificates. The probability pi of operating with a revoked
certificate is equal for each user in the network, and conditional on pi operat-
ing with revoked certificates of different users are statistically independent.
This probability is out of the user’s control so that no moral hazard problem
arises. Except for their probabilities of operating with revoked certificates,
individuals are assumed to be identical. However, pi is not known ex-ante
with certainty but is a random variable distributed on [pi;pi] with cumulative
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density function F (pi). Each user has an initial wealth w > 0. When operat-
ing with a revoked certificate, users may suffer a loss. We assume that the
user’s wealth exceeds the potential loss, that is, l ≤ w.
Users can purchase different certificate types from the CA with different
revocation updating service. We characterize this product by the price of
the certificate Pi > 0 and an indemnity Ci > 0 the CA pays to the user if
it suffers from an attack and operates with another user whose certificate
was revoked. Note that as CRLs are not issued each time a certificate is
revoked but periodically, users will be operating with outdated information.
Let (Pi, Ci, ti, si) be a certificate contract offered by CAi which specifies the
price Pi to be paid by an user and the level of coverage Ci paid to the user
if an attack takes place and she operates with a revoked certificate. Let ti
represent the CRL updating interval, and si represent the security level.
Let us assume that the total utility U which users can get after they
purchase a certificate consists of two parts. The first part is wealth utility
which represented by Uw the other part is QoS utility which the applicant
can get after they obtained the CA’s services, represented by UQoS . The total
utility U is defined as:
U(Pi, Ci, ti, si) = α1Uw + α2UQoS ,∀αk ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
αk = 1; k = 1, 2. (1)
where αi represents the significance level of U respectively.
On the one hand, we calculate the wealth utility. If no attack due to misuse
of a revoked certificate happens after the user has purchase the service the
CA, a user gains w−Pi, on the contrary a user gains w−Pi+Ci. We assume
that all users have same loss with two-point distribution:
µ = (w − Pi)(1− pi) + (w − Pi + Ci)pi = w − Pi + piCi, (2)
σ2 = pi(1− pi)C2i . (3)
Hence we can characterize the wealth utility by the mean and variance of
Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) respectively. Thus, we can define Uw as a mean-variance
utility function:
Uw(Pi, Ci) = µ−Rσ2, (4)
where R represents the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion. This
means that the larger R is, the more risk averse the user is and the smaller
Uw is.
On the other hand, let UQoS be a linear function of the QoS that the CA
offers. Thus, we define UQoS as:
UQoS(ti, si) = piθ
(
β1si + β2
1
ti
)
,∀βk ∈ [0, 1],
∑
βk = 1 and θ > 0; k = 1, 2. (5)
where θ represents the quality preference parameter of the user, and β1
represents the user’s preference to security level and β2 represents the user’s
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preference to CRL issuing interval. Note that the higher the level of security
the CA provides, the larger UQoS is; the longer the CRL updating interval
is, the smaller UQoS is. It is also worth noting that θ is unknown to the CAs
a priori.
In order to calculate the total utility of the user, we must unify the di-
mension of the security level and the CRL updating interval. Thus, using
(1),(4) and (5) the total utility is calculated as:
U(Pi, Ci, ti, si) = α1[w − Pi − piCi −Rpi(1− pi)C2i ] + α2
[
piθ
(
β1si + β2
1
ti
)]
. (6)
Note that according to this expression, users are willing to pay higher
prices for those certificates whose issuer provides a better QoS. Note that
issuing certificate status information faster, highly increases the QoS of the
revocation service. Thus, certificates linked to a better revocation service
provide more utility to the user.
3.2 Supply of certificates
We consider an oligopoly of CAs operating in the certification market. CAs
compete for users by offering certificates and CRLs. The service qualities of
their CA products are also different. The level of service quality is mainly
shown by the CRL updating interval and the security level1.
When choosing a CA, a user takes into account several factors. Our goal
is to gauge the impact of the revocation service on the certificate prices. How-
ever, it should be noted that, for convenience, many website owners choose
the registrar’s authority regardless of the price. Before issuing a certificate,
the CA verifies that the person making the request is authorized to use the
domain. The CA sends an email message to the domain administrator (the
administrative or registrant contact, as listed in the Whois database) to vali-
date domain control. If there is no contact information in the Whois database
or the information is no longer valid, the customer may instead request a
Domain Authorization Letter from his/her registrar and submit the letter to
the CA as proof of his/her domain control. If the administrative/registrant
contact fails to approve the certificate request, the request is denied. This
authentication process ensures that only an individual who has control of the
domain in the request can obtain a certificate for that domain. Therefore as
CAs compete by quoting a certificate price which has associated a particular
quality of service, we have Bertrand competition. The CA that quotes the
lowest certificate price with the highest QoS sells to all users.
1 Note that additional QoS parameters could be introduced in the model. In fact, CAs dis-
tinguish themselves by offering additional value-added services (e.g. GoDaddy bundling
domain registration with certificate issuance), turn-around time, etc.
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4 Equilibrium Certificate Providers
In this section we consider the certification industry with an oligopoly of A
certification authorities and analyze the competitive forces that determine
equilibrium of certificate selling. Our main goal is to find the prices at which
CAs obtain their maximum profit, i.e., when they reach the game equilibrium.
Recall that these certificates differ in the QoS so that ∀i, j; i 6= j, ti 6= tj and
si 6= sj . We assume that the certification market is covered in full. Users will
intend to maximize their utility, i.e.:
θ∗ = arg max
θ
U(Pi, Ci). (7)
On the other hand, CAs will intend to minimize their costs. The CA’s
costs consists of fixed and variable costs. Each time a new CRL is issued,
a CA incurs both fixed and variable costs. The fixed cost depends on two
factors. The fix component is due to the release of a new CRL, and does not
depend on the number or certificate type. The variable factor depends on the
number of certificates contained in the CRL (i.e. depends on the size of the
CRL) and on the type of certificate (i.e. certificate with higher security level
induce higher costs). Note that in this variable cost it is included the cost of
processing each certificate revocation request. We define the service quality
cost of CAi (i.e. Q(si, ti)) as a variable that includes both fixed and variable
costs associated to the QoS. The first and second derivative of Q(si, ti) with
respect to si, ti are positive. Hence, we can calculate the gain function Gi of
any CAi:
Gi = θ
∗Pi −Q(si, ti), (8)
where the gain function captures the overall profits of CAi for a given cer-
tificate product characterized by (Pi, Ci).
We assume that the game between the two CAs is static with incomplete
information, they choose the respective certificate price at the same time to
maximize their profits. Now we differentiate (8) with respect to Pi and Ci.
In order to obtain the certificate price and the coverage in the equilibrium,
let each derivative formula equal to zero. Solving the resulting linear system,
we will obtain the price of each CA P ∗i and the corresponding coverage C
∗
i .
P ∗i :
∂Gi
∂Pi
= 0, C∗i :
∂Gi
∂Ci
= 0. (9)
4.1 Duopoly of CAs
To better illustrate the results obtained in the previous section, we particu-
larize the case of the oligopoly to a duopoly where only two CAs are offering
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certificates. This simplification, we allows us to draw some conclusion that
can be easily extrapolated to the real scenario where there are more than a
dozen CAs. To show that the level of service quality depends on the CA, we
assume that the CA indexed by i = 1 offers better quality than the second
CA in both QoS parameters, i.e., t1 < t2 and s1 > s2 .
Following the methodology aforementioned, we have to find the prices in
the equilibrium. In this situation, first we find the value of θ∗ at which a user
has no obvious trend between the certificates offered by different CAs.
α1[w − P1 − piC1 −Rpi(1− pi)C21 ] + α2
[
piθ
(
β1s1 + β2
1
t1
)]
=
α1[w − P2 − piC2 −Rpi(1− pi)C22 ] + α2
[
piθ
(
β1s2 + β2
1
t2
)]
, (10)
which results in:
θ∗ =
α1 (P1 − P2 + piC1(1 +RC1 −RpiC1)− piC2(1−RC2 +RpiC2))
piα2K
(11)
where K = β1(s1 − s2) + β2
(
1
t1
− 1t2
)
. So the market demand of CA2 is θ
∗,
and the demand of CA1 is 1− θ∗.
Using (8) we calculate the gain function Gi of CA1 and CA2 :
G1 = (1− θ∗P1)−Q(s1, t1), (12)
G2 = θ
∗P2 −Q(s2, t2). (13)
We obtain the certificate price and the coverage in the equilibrium :
P ∗1 =
2pi α2K
3α1
P ∗2 =
pi α2K
3α1
, C∗1 = C
∗
2 =
1
2R (−1 + pi) . (14)
From these results we can conclude that:
– In the equilibrium, when both CAs achieve their maximum gain, CA1
obtains a higher price than CA2. This is mainly due to the fact that
when both CAs have associated the same probability of an attack, as
the QoS of the first CA is better so that CA1 can set a higher price per
certificate.
– In the equilibrium, the coverage that each CA should establish is the same
and is inversely proportional to the risk-aversion and the probability of
operating with a revoked certificate.
5 Analysis and Results
5.1 Impact of the preference ratio α2
α1
As the ratio between the preference of QoS utility and wealth utility of the
user increases (i.e., users are more interested in a high security service and
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a good revocation mechanism) the prices of both CAs in the equilibrium
also increase. This effect is reasonable, as the improvement of the revocation
mechanism gives a higher security level which also increases the costs. This
cost increment is compensated with a higher price in the equilibrium. Ana-
lyzing two CAs operating in the oligopoly such that ti < tj and si > sj , it
is worth noting that the increment speed of CAi’s QoS is faster than that
of CAj , so the increment speed of its certificate price is also faster than the
other CA.
5.2 Impact of the security level difference
When the level of security that a CA offers is much higher than in the others,
the certificate value is also much higher. Thus, CAs that offer certificates with
higher level of encryption and larger keys are able to make their certification
product differentiable. For instance, SSL security levels vary depending upon
the way on SSL certificate is installed on a server and the configuration used.
SSL is simple to use but its security can be compromised if basic installation
an configurations are not completed to a competent level, hackers are then
able to decrypt the security on a badly installed SSL certificate. Once the
certificates of a CA are differentiable from the other CAs, CAs do not have
to use malignant prices anymore to compete. As the difference of this QoS
between CAs becomes bigger, the prices that they can charge also increase.
Note that if the preference extent which the user shows to the security level
(i.e. β1) increases, the differences in the certificates as products will be more
apparent, thus the increase in the CA’s certificate prices will also increase.
The same results are expected with the increment of the interest of the users
to a better service from the CAs (α2), that is, not higher security but also a
more efficient revocation mechanism.
5.3 Impact of the QoS of the revocation mechanism
CAs that are able to offer revocation mechanisms with fresher information
and high availability are able to make their certification product differen-
tiable. Recall that this QoS increase of the revocation mechanism induces
higher costs, as revocation information has to be issued more frequently.
These costs are compensated with an increase of the price that CAs can
charge for the certificates in the equilibrium. The reasons are the same that
in the previous case, but now users pay more attention to the revocation
mechanism rather than to the level of security. Analytically, that means that
β2 increases, so that the user is more interested in the efficiency of the re-
vocation mechanism. This increase induces a proportional increase in the
equilibrium prices of the CAs. Note that in this case, the increase of CAi
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which has higher QoS of the revocation mechanism is faster than that of
CAj . Again, the CA that has better service (no matter if it is higher se-
curity level or a more efficient revocation mechanism) has the advantage in
competition.
5.4 Impact of the revocation probability
Logically, with an increase of the probability of operating with a revoked
certificate, CAs charge more for their certificates. The reason is obvious as
the CAs set they price mainly based on a forecast of this probability. An
increase of pi will induce an increase of the compensation expenses that a CA
will have to pay to any victim of an attack due to the misuse of a revoked
certificate. Consequently, this increase will lead to a proportional increase of
compensation cost and service cost so that the CAs have to increase their
prices to compensate the cost increases. Note that this increase is twice faster
in the case of the CAi.
6 Case Study: SSL Providers
Finally, to corroborate the benefits of the presented model, we analyze the
case of current SSL providers that issue digital certificates. An SSL certificate
can be obtained from amounts as low as $43 to as high as $3000 per year.
Whilst the type of encryption can be the same, the cost is determined by
the rigour of the certification process as well as the assurance and warranty
that the vendor can provide. Table 1 shows the prices and QoS that the
leading CAs operating in the SSL Certificate market are offering. The SSL
Certificate market was traditionally dominated by a small number of players,
namely VeriSign and Thawte. Whilst in a monopolistic position they had
the capability of charging inflated prices for a commodity product. However
new providers with no necessity to hold prices high were able to offer SSL
certificates at far more reasonable prices.
The SSL certificate vendors provide insurance against the misuse of certifi-
cates and this differs from one vendor to another. Verisign provides warranties
of up to $250,000 while Entrust and GoDaddy offer a $10,000 warranty. The
higher the insurance, the more inscription/authentication is provided by the
SSL vendors. Analyzing Table 1, it is worth noting that not always a lower
price means lower quality. Therefore, it is evident that current CAs operating
in this market are competing both in price and quality of service.
To test whether these factors are determinant factors for the certficate
prices, we perform a multivariate regression analysis explaining the yearly
price of SSL certificates. General regression investigates and models the re-
lationship between a response (Certificate price) and predictors (Warranty,
issuing interval and CRL lifetime). Note that the response of this model is
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SSL Provider Product Name Price/Year($) Warranty($) Assurance Mean Issuing time Mean CRL
lifetime
COMODO EnterpriseSSL Plat-
inum
311.80 1,000,000 High Under 1 hour 4 days
COMODO InstantSSL Pro 169.80 100,000 High Under 1 hour 4 days
Verisign Secure Site Pro Cert 826.67 2,500,000 High 2-3 days 15 days
Verisign Managed PKI for
SSL Std
234.00 100,000 High 2-3 days 15 days
GeoTrust QuickSSL Premium 118.00 100,000 Low Immediate 10 days
GeoTrust True BusinessID 159.20 100,000 High 2 days 10 days
Go Daddy Standard SSL 42.99 10,000 Low Immediate 1 day
Go Daddy Standard Wildcard 179.99 10,000 Low Immediate 1 day
Entrust Advantage SSL Cer-
tificates
167.00 10,000 High 2 days 1 week
Entrust Standard SSL Cer-
tificates
132.00 10,000 High 2 days 1 week
Thawte SSL 123 129.80 - Low Immediate 1 month
Thawte SGC Super cert 599.80 - High 2 days 1 month
Table 1. SSL Certificate Types and Services offered by main CAs [9].
continuous, but you we have both continuous and categorical predictors. You
can model both linear and polynomial relationships using general regression.
With this model we determine how the certficate price changes as a particu-
lar predictor variable changes. We use data from a survey of CAs performed
in 2010 [9]. The obtained regression model is expressed in the following equa-
tions for high and low assurance certificates, respectively:
Price/Y ear($) = 98, 4353 + 0, 000220857 W − 0, 549141 Itime + 8, 6116 1
CRLLf
,
P rice/Y ear($) = 20, 0405 + 0, 000220857 W − 0, 5491411 Itime + 8, 6116 1
CRLLf
,
where W denotes the warranty, Itime is the mean issuing time, and CRLLf
is the mean lifetime of the CRLs issued by the CA.
Note that both regression equations show that the coefficient of the pre-
dictor associated to the CRL’s mean lifetime is significant. In fact, the p-value
associated to this predictor is 0, 008 which indicates that is statistically signif-
icantly. Overall, the variables within the model are explaining a large portion
of the variation in the certificate price. With a coefficient of determination
R2 above the 81%, we are capturing important drivers of certificate prices.
The residuals from the analysis are normally distributed, i.e., no evidence of
nonnormality, skewness, or unidentified variables exists.
Using the proposed model, we are able to explain these different prices
and the corresponding market share and they potential evolution. First we
analyze the number of revoked certificates as it will determine the probability
of operating with a revoked certificate. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the
daily number of revoked certificates per CA. These data were collected from
different SSL CRLs that the CAs make public at their repositories. It is worth
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the daily number of revoked certificates per CA.
noting, that the number of revoked certificates highly varies depending on the
CA. Thus, GoDaddy revokes more than 500 certificates per day on average
while VerSign revokes less than 4 certificates per day on average. Therefore,
the probability pi of operating with revoked certificates is higher when trust-
ing certificates issued by GoDaddy. As our model shows, using expression
(14), the probability pi directly affects the price of the certificate. Thus, as
GoDaddy has a higher pi, we would expect to charge less for its certificates.
However, the price is quite similar to its competitors. Thus, GoDaddy is not
able to sell as much certificates as the other oligarchs, and its market share
is smaller.
Our model would expect GoDaddy to compete not only in prices but also
in QoS to gain market share. As our model shows, the reaction of GoDaddy
to compete in the oligopoly is to offer better quality of service. From table 1,
we can see that GoDaddy is the CA that issues CRLs more often. Using
this CRL releasing policy, users increase their utility and, at the same time,
the probability of operating with a revoked certificate is also reduced. How-
ever, the variable costs increase due to this way of issuing CRLs. Similarly,
Comodo intends to gain market share by decreasing the time it takes to is-
sue a certificate and also reducing the CRL lifetime. Note that VeriSign, the
leading CA, is the one who is offering the worst QoS, both in terms of CRL
lifetime and time to issue a new certificate.
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7 Conclusions
The market of certificate providers can be described as an oligopoly where
oligarchs compete not only in price but also in quality of service. In this
paper we have modeled this oligopoly using a game theoretic approach to
find the prices in the equilibrium. We have been able to capture the QoS of
the products offered by a CA, by means of the timeliness of the revocation
mechanism and the security level. In our model of the certification industry
with profit-maximizing CAs and a continuum of individuals we showed that
although the undercutting process in certification prices seems similar to the
price setting behavior of firms in Bertrand competition there exists a crucial
difference depending onf the QoS of the revocation service. The solution of
the game for two CAs in the oligopoly that offer certificates with different
QoS shows that the revenues of the CA which provides a better revocation
mechanism and a higher security level are larger. Therefore, a CA when
setting the prices of its certificate and the compensation expenses, it has
to take into account not only the probability of operating with a revoked
certificate, but also the quality of the revocation mechanism and the security
level. Thus, any CA should comprehensively consider the difference in quality
of its services compared with other CAs.
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Abstract. One of the hardest tasks of a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) is to manage revocation. Different revocation mechanisms have
been proposed to invalidate the credentials of compromised or misbe-
having users. All these mechanisms aim to optimize the transmission of
revocation data to avoid unnecessary network overhead. To that end,
they establish release policies based on the assumption that the revoca-
tion data follows uniform or Poisson distribution. Temporal distribution
of the revocation data has a significant influence on the performance and
scalability of the revocation service. In this paper, we demonstrate that
the temporal distribution of the daily number of revoked certificates is
statistically self-similar, and that the currently assumed Poisson distribu-
tion does not capture the statistical properties of the distribution. None
of the commonly used revocation models takes into account this fractal
behavior, though such behavior has serious implications for the design,
control, and analysis of revocation protocols such as CRL or delta-CRL.
Keywords: Self-similarity, Certification, Public Key Infrastructure, Re-
vocation.
1 Introduction
Today we are in the midst of an electronic business revolution. It is of
utmost importance that mechanisms are set up to ensure information
and data security. Organizations have recognized the need to balance the
concern for protecting information and data with the desire to leverage
the electronic medium. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a step toward
providing a secure environment by using a system of digital certificates
and certificate authorities (CAs). However, one of the most important
aspects in the design of a PKI is certificate revocation.
Certificate revocation is the process of removing the validity of a cer-
tificate prematurely. There could be multiple reasons for revoking a cer-
tificate; such as the certificate holder leaves the organization or there is
146
2a suspicion of private key compromise. When a certificate is revoked, the
information about the revoked certificate needs to be published. Some of
the methods that a CA can use to revoke certificates are:
– Periodic Publication Mechanisms: Information about revoked certifi-
cates can be posted on a certificate server so that the users are warned
from using those certificates. This mechanism includes the use of
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) and Certificate Revocation Trees
(CRT). A CRL is a signed list of certificates that have been revoked or
suspended. CRT is a revocation technology, which is based on Merkle
hash trees, where the tree represents all known certificate revocation
information relevant to some known set of PKI communities.
– Online Query Mechanisms: Online Query Mechanisms comprise On-
line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) and Online Transaction Val-
idation Protocols. OCSP is used to obtain online revocation informa-
tion about certificates, and Online Transaction Validation Protocols
are used for online validation, such as business transactions through
credit cards.
A revocation method is selected by an organization based on the cost,
infrastructure, and volumes of transactions that are expected. To gauge
these costs, different revocation mechanisms are tested under the assump-
tion that the revocation events follow a specific probability distribution.
Most theoretical frameworks and simulation studies for performance eval-
uation assume that the temporal distribution of queries follows a Poisson
distribution. Thus, organizations estimate the infrastructure needed to
deploy the PKI and the associated costs. However, in this article, we
demonstrate that revocation data is statistically self-similar, that none
of the commonly used revocation models is able to capture this fractal
behavior, and that such behavior has serious implications for the design,
control, and analysis of revocation protocols such as CRLs.
We start by analyzing the validity of Poisson-like process assumption.
We use publicly available CRLs from different certification authorities
(containing more than 300,000 revoked certificates over a period of three
years). Our analysis demonstrates that the Poisson distribution fails to
capture the statistical properties of the actual revocation process. We also
see that the Poisson distribution grossly under-estimates the bandwidth
utilization of the revocation mechanism. At first glance, this might look
like an obvious result, since after all as a memoryless process, Poisson dis-
tribution cannot be expected to model periodic trends like daily, weekly
and monthly cycles in revocation rates. We show however that the mod-
eling inability transcends simple cycles. In particular, we will show that
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3self-similarity has a severe detrimental impact on the revocation service
performance.
Results of our analysis, including burstiness at all scales, strongly
suggest self-similar nature of revocation events. We confirm this by esti-
mating the Hurst parameter for the observed distribution and showing
that the estimates validate self-similar nature of the revocation lists. Be-
yond invalidating Poisson-like distributions, this proof of self-similarity
has the important implications on CA utilization, throughput, and certifi-
cate stratus checking time. Intuitively, as the revocation process is bursty
(non-uniformly distributed) the CA will be partially idle during low burst
periods and vice versa. Thus, the revocation lists will grow non-uniformly,
and current updating policies will result bandwidth inefficient.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the nec-
essary statistical background required to understand self-similar processes
and long range dependency. In Section 3, we discuss the methodology we
used to collect and analyze real-world revocation data. We demonstrate
self-similar nature of the revocation data, followed by a Hurst parame-
ter estimation. In Section 4 we discuss how the observed self-similarity
has crucial implications on performance of the revocation service. Next
section discusses the related work in the area. Finally, we conclude in
Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Self-Similar Processes
A phenomenon which is self-similar looks the same or behaves the same
when viewed at different degree of magnification. Self-similarity [1] is the
property of a series of data points to retain a pattern or appearance
regardless of the level of granularity used and can be the result of long-
range dependence (LRD) in the data series. One of the main properties
of the self-similar data is burstiness [1]. Bursty data do not possess a
stable mean value. Significant differences in the mean value are one of the
reasons why bursty data are more difficult to control than shaped one.
If a self-similar process is bursty at a wide range of timescales, it may
often exhibit long-range dependence. Long-range-dependence means that
all the values at any time are correlated in a positive and non-negligible
way with values at all future instants.
A stochastic process Y (t) is self-similar with Hurst parameter H if
for any positive stretching factor d, the distribution of the rescaled and
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4reindexed process d−HY (dt) is equivalent to that of the original pro-
cess Y (t). This means for any sequence of time points t1, . . . , tn and
any positive constant d, the collections {d−HY (dt1), . . . , d−HY (dtn)} and
{Y (t1), . . . , Y (tn)} are governed by the same probability law. When the
values of H are in the interval (0.5, 1), the process presents LRD. A value
of H equal to 0.5 indicates the absence of LRD. This means that the
smoothing with aggregation is much slower for self-similar processes, the
greater the degree of self-similarity, the slower will be smoothing with
aggregation.
Three implications of self-similarity are:
– No natural length of bursts.
– Presence of bursts in all time scales.
– Process does not smooth out on aggregation.
2.2 Statistical Tests For Self-Similarity
The practical way to estimate degree of self-similarity is to measure the
values of Hurst exponent. In this paper we use five methods to test for
self-similarity (details about these methods are described in [2, 3]).
The first method, the variance-time plot, relies on the slowly decaying
variance of a self-similar series. The variance of Y (m) is plotted against m
on a log-log plot; a straight line with slope (β) greater than -1 is indicative
of self-similarity, and the parameter H is given by H = 1 − β/2. The
second method, the R/S plot, uses the fact that for a self-similar dataset,
the rescaled range or R/S statistic grows according to a power law with
exponent H as a function of the number of points included (n). Thus the
plot of R/S against n on a log-log plot has slope which is an estimate of
H. The third approach, the periodogram method, uses the slope of the
power spectrum of the series as frequency approaches zero. On a log-log
plot, the periodogram slope is a straight line with slope close to the origin.
While the preceding three graphical methods are useful for exposing
faulty assumptions (such as non-stationarity in the dataset) they do not
provide confidence intervals. The fourth method, called the Whittle esti-
mator does provide a confidence interval, but has the drawback that the
form of the underlying stochastic process must be supplied. The two forms
that are most commonly used are fractional Gaussian noise (FGN) with
parameter 1/2 < H < 1, and Fractional ARIMA(p,d,q) with 0 < d < 1/2
(for details see [2])). These two models differ in their assumptions about
the short-range dependences in the datasets; FGN assumes no short-range
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5dependence while Fractional ARIMA can assume a fixed degree of short-
range dependence. There are several other methods in frequency and time
domain to measure the Hurst parameter.
Finally, we use the Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (DFA) [4], which
aims to highlight the long-range dependence of a time series with trend.
DFA method is a version for time series with trend of the method of
aggregated variance used for a long-memory stationary process. It consists
in aggregating the process by windows with fixed length, detrending the
process from a linear regression in each window, computing the standard
deviation of the residual errors (the DFA function) for all data, and finally,
estimating the coefficient of the power law from a log-log regression of the
DFA function on the length of the chosen window.
3 Examining the self-similarity of the revocation process
3.1 Data Collection
In order to capture the temporal correlation of the revocation process,
first we have to gather a large sample of revocation data. The approach
we follow consists in collecting revocation data from different certification
authorities using their available CRLs. In particular, we built some scripts
to download and preprocess the CRLs from the following CAs1: VeriSign,
GoDaddy, Thawte, and Comodo.
Issuer Name Number of Revoked Certificates Last Update Next Update
GoDaddy 932,900 2012/02/01 2012/02/03
VeriSign 5,346 2012/02/02 2012/02/16
Comodo 2,727 2012/02/03 2012/02/06
GlobalSign 7,591 2012/02/02 2012/03/03
Thawte 8,061 2012/02/01 2012/02/16
Table 1: Description of the collected CRLs.
Though we concentrate our analysis on CRL because it is the most
common and simplest method for certificate revocation [6], we expect the
1 According to NetCraft’s survey [5], using these CAs we cover most of the world
market for SSL.
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6captured pattern to be extensible to any other revocation mechanism (e.g.
OCSP).
Once downloaded the revocation data, we preprocess these data to
remove duplicated information (e.g. certificates that are revoked due to
several reasons). Note that when a revoked certificate expires, it typically
remains in the CRLs for one additional publication interval, so we prepro-
cess the CRLs to remove expired certificates too. In this sense, Thawte’s
and GlobalSign’s CRLs may contain duplicate entries for the same certifi-
cate because of their policy statements. These policy statements impose
that a certificate that is revoked by several reasons must be included in
the CRL as many times as the number of revocation reasons. Thus, we
remove any duplicate entry from the composite dataset, and tally the
number of revocations per day. Finally, we build a dataset that covers
non-expired revoked certificates from 2008 to 2012 (see Figure 1).
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Fig. 1: Number of daily revoked certificates evolution for each CA.
3.2 Evidence of Burstiness
Before providing formal estimation of self-similarity, we provide a graph-
ical evidence of bursty nature of the revocation data at different time
scales. We also show that this observed burstiness is not accounted by
the Poisson distribution. In Figure 2, we show the revocation logs in four
different time scales-ranging from 1 hour to 1 day. Each plot is obtained by
151
7changing the time resolution. In Figure 2 we can observe different evident
trends; (i) Burstiness in all time scales: the burstiness of the revocation
process does not disappear when changing the time scales. (ii) Lack of
natural length of bursts: The figure shows burstiness ranging from days
to months. Note that the full duration of the figure with the largest time
slot is 1,000 days, and some of the bursts have many hours of duration.
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Fig. 2: Revocation Bursts over Four Orders of Magnitude.
In addition, it is worth noting the difference between this bursty pat-
tern and a Poisson process. A Poisson process smooths out with large
time scales and resembles a uniformly distributed white noise at higher
time scales. In contrast to the revocation process, in a Poisson process the
burstiness vanishes in coarse time scales, longer length bursts are absent,
and bursts smooths out much faster. Thus, the trends of self-similarity
present in the revocation data discussed above are totally absent for Pois-
son processes.
Therefore, modeling the revocation process as Poisson is clearly inad-
equate, and is thus likely to give unrealistic results. We will elaborate this
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8analysis in the next section, and discuss the consequences of self-similarity
in the following sections
3.3 Statistical Analysis of Self-Similarity
In this section, we use five different methods to estimate the Hurst param-
eter to demonstrate the long range dependency of the revocation events
formally. Since there are different manifestations of self-similarity, differ-
ent methods in time and frequency domains are used in practice for the
estimation (see Sec. 2.2). Note that when using these estimators with
real-life revocation data containing noise, cycles and trends, they might
estimate different values of the Hurst parameter. For that reason, we use
multiple methods, report the correlation coefficients and confidence in-
tervals by different methods, and visually inspect the data for trends and
cycles. The chances of estimates agreeing on real data is small [7], but if
most of the estimates are above 0.5 the LRD is likely to exist.
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Fig. 3: Autocorrelation function of the revocation process per CA.
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9First of all, we start analyzing the autocorrelation of the revocation
data. Recall that in a self-similar process autocorrelations decay hyperbol-
ically rather than exponentially fast, implying a nonsummable autocor-
relation function
∑
k r(k) = ∞ (long-range dependence). For the frame
data, the empirical autocorrelation functions r(k) are shown in Fig. 3,
with lag k ranging from 0 to 100. Notice that r(k) decreases slower than
exponentially no matter the CA. The curve does decay toward zero, but
it does so extremely slowly. The very slowly decaying autocorrelations are
indicative of LRD.
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Fig. 4: Graphical methods for checking for self-similarity of the revocation
process from GoDaddy (a) variance-time plot, (b) pox plot of R/S, (c)
periodogram plot, and (d) DFA plot.
In the following, we use five different methods for assessing self-similarity
described in Section 2.2: the variance-time plot, the rescaled range (or
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R/S) plot, the periodogram plot, the DFA plot and the Whittle esti-
mator. We concentrated on individual months from our revocation time
series, so as to provide as nearly a stationary dataset as possible. To pro-
vide an example of these approaches, analysis of a single month from Go-
Daddy revocation data is shown in Figure 4. The figure shows plots for the
four graphical methods: variance-time (upper left), rescaled range (upper
right), periodogram (lower left) and DFA (lower right). The variance-
time plot is linear and shows a slope that is distinctly different from
-1 (which is shown for comparison); the slope is estimated using regres-
sion as -0.077, yielding an estimate for H of 0.96. The R/S plot shows
an asymptotic slope that is different from 0.5 and from 1.0 (shown for
comparison); it is estimated using regression as 0.95, which is also the cor-
responding estimate of H. The periodogram plot shows a slope of -0.14
(the regression line is shown), yielding an estimate of H as 0.83. Finally,
the Whittle estimator for this revocation data (not a graphical method)
yields an estimated Hurst value of 0,923 with a 95% confidence interval
of (0.87, 0.95).
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Fig. 5: Summary plot of estimates of the Hurst parameter H for all the
CAs.
Once we have seen that GoDaddy presents a significant self-similar
pattern, we analyze the rest of the CAs. To that end, we use the whittle
estimator to obtain the Hurst value per CA and month. We chose this es-
timator because it gives more refined measurement than other estimation
techniques and it provides confidence levels for the Hurst parameter [8].
Note that we are not interested in estimating the exact value of the Hurst
parameter but to prove the existence of self-similarity in the revocation
155
11
data. Figure 5 shows the H parameter of each CA and the 95% confidence
interval. It is worth noting that depending on the month there are some
CAs whose H parameter varies significantly. However, no matter neither
the CA nor the month, the Hurst value is always above 0.7. This means
that the revocation process of any CA presents LRD.
4 Significance of self-similarity for revocation data
management
Our collected data from real CAs show dramatically different statistical
properties than those assumed by the stochastic models currently con-
sidered in the literature. Almost all these models are characterized by an
exponentially decaying autocorrelation function. As a result, they give
rise to a Hurst parameter estimate of Hˆ = .50, producing variance-time
curves, R/S plots, and frequency domain behavior strongly disagreeing
with the self-similar behavior of actual revocation (see Section 3.3). In
this section, we emphasize direct implications of the self-similar nature of
the revocation data in the performance of the revocation service.
4.1 Impact on the revocation mechanism
As we mentioned before, traditional mechanisms made assumptions about
the revocation process to obtain efficient revocation data issuing policies.
However, these assumptions neglect the self-similar nature of the revoca-
tion data. This has a direct impact due to the “burstiness” of the data
and affects the congestion management of the CA/repositories.
To give an idea of the impact of self-similarity, we analyze the work
of Cooper in [9] and in [10]. In these works, Cooper analyzed the best
way to issue CRLs, segmented CRLs and delta-CRLs in order to decrease
the request peak bandwidth. The author assumed that an average of
1,000 certificates are revoked each day and that the CRLs have a fixed
validity time. By doing these assumptions, the self-similar behavior of the
revocation process is neglected and the results need to be adapted to the
reality.
Using the traditional approach, CRLs are published periodically. Un-
der this assumption, CAs expect that consecutive CRLs should have simi-
lar size. However, this assumption is proven completely wrong when bursts
are present. Thus, consecutive CRLs can differ significantly in the number
of revoked certificates they include, and, consequently in their size. Using
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the data collected from Verisign2, we studied how the size of the CRLs
varies when CRLs are issued daily. As in [10], we estimate that the size of
a CRL is 51 bytes plus 9 bytes for each certificate included on the CRL.
If an average of r certificates are revoked each day, certificates are valid
for Lc days, and a certificate, at the time of revocation, has an average
of Lc2 days until it expires, then the average size of a CRL will be [10]:
SizeCRL = 51 + 4.5· r · Lc.
We assume that certificates have a lifetime of 365 days [11], therefore
we can calculate the daily size of the Verisign CRL for 5 randomly cho-
sen months. We execute the trial several times and check that the same
depency is obtained. Figure 6 shows the results in a box-plot. Note that
the CRL size has a mean size of around 150 KBytes, but it highly varies
due to the revocation bursts. For instance, during March 2008, there were
four CRLs that exceed the 300 KBytes. These variations are highly ineffi-
cient in terms of bandwidth, as during some days the required bandwidth
double the bandwidth needed in previous days. Although this has not
become a bottleneck in wired networks, novel scenarios (e.g. Vehicular
Networks) cannot afford these variations.
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Fig. 6: Estimated daily size of Verisign’s CRL.
2 Note that we use the data from VeriSign to provide a case study of variance in size
of the CRLs. The same variance pattern applies to the other CAs, though it is not
shown in this article.
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However, the self-similarity not only affects traditional CRL issuance,
but also its variants that aim to be bandwidth efficient such as delta-CRL.
From [10], the bandwidth for a delta-CRL system can be computed as:
B =
Nve−vt((51 + 4.5rLc)e−(w+
l
O
−l)v + (51 + 9rw))
(O − 1)1− evl/O + 1 , (1)
where N is the number of valid certificates, v is the validation rate, l is
the amount of time that a delta-CRL is valid, Lc is the certificate lifetime,
r is the number of certificates revoked per day, w is the window size of
the delta-CRL and O is the number of delta-CRLs that are valid at any
given time.
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Fig. 7: Delta-CRL BW consumption.
Using the bandwidth as a comparison metric, we can evaluate the
impact of the self-similarity. Figure 7 shows the bandwidth necessary to
download the revocation data using a sliding window delta-CRL scheme.
We have assumed that there are 300,000 relying parties (N) each vali-
dating an average of 10 certificates per day (v); delta-CRLs are issued
once an hour, are valid for 4 hours (O), and have a window size of 9
hours (w). We have also assumed that an average of 10 certificates are
revoked each day (r) and that certificates are valid for 365 days (Lc).
Note that depending on the distribution of the revocation process, the
required bandwidth presents significant variations. We change the num-
ber of certificates revoked per day (r) according to three different distri-
butions (i.e. uniform, Poisson and self-similar) and evaluate the required
bandwidth of a delta-CRL system using Eq. (1). Uniform and Poisson
distributions present a similar behavior. On the opposite, a self-similar
process makes the delta-CRL’s size to vary. Thus, the optimal window
to issue delta-CRLs should be calculated taking into account the bursty
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pattern of the self-similar process. If this pattern is neglected, the peak
bandwidth will vary with each delta-CRL issuance making the revocation
service bandwidth-inefficient. When with a Poisson or uniform process the
maximum peak bandwidth is of ∼12Kb/s, a burst of revocation events
causes that some delta-CRL issuance require more than ∼20Kb/s. There-
fore, ignoring the self-similar pattern of the revocation process leads to
inaccurate network planning.
CRL releasing strategies might be optimized considering the effect of
self-similarity. Periodic updates might create bottlenecks at the reposito-
ries when all users request new information at the same time. On the other
hand, online checking mechanisms such as OCSP, could be computation-
ally overloaded during bursty periods. Such mechanisms that base their
efficiency on using pre-signed responses have not been conceived to work
under bursty patterns. Therefore, further analysis should be conducted
to establish pre-signing policies under bursty revocation periods.
5 Related Work
Most of previous studies fail to capture the characteristics of real-world
revocation data; instead, they focus on theoretical aspects of certificate
revocation including the model of revocation [9], the revocation cause [12],
and the cost of issuing revocation information [13]. Thus, these theoretical
models are not able to capture the actual pattern of the revocation data.
Most recently, the statistical properties of real revocation data have been
studied [14–16]. Nevertheless, the bursty pattern of the revocation process
is neglected.
Regarding the traditional way of issuing CRLs, X.509 [17] defines
one method to release CRLs. This method involves each CA periodically
issuing CRLs. Using this method, the number of revoked certificates con-
tained in each CRL varies significantly. Thus, each CRL has a different
size, and the issuance of the CRLs results bandwidth inefficient. Authors
in [15] already acknowledged the inefficiencies of the traditional method,
and proposed releasing CRLs based on a set of economic costs. How-
ever, they assumed a Poisson process when characterizing the number of
new certificate revocations, i.e., they neglected the burst pattern. Thus,
the resulting CRL releasing policies could be improved by taking into
account the self-similarity of the revocation process. Similarly, authors
in [18] collected empirical data about the reasons and frequency of user
terminations that require certificate revocations, and then model the con-
sequences for certificate revocation. They investigate how to reduce the
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cost of certificate revocation by reducing the number of revoked certifi-
cates and bandwidth consumption in order to achieve better scalability.
In the same manner, authors in [14] carried out a thorough empirical
analysis of the revocation data not only taking into account the number
of revoked certificates, but also other factors such as geographical regions
and revocation causes. They also conclude that their collected CRLs ex-
hibit exponential distribution patterns. Though they acknowledge the
existence of revocation bursts, they do not capture this behavior. On the
other hand, authors in [16] suggest a functional form for the probability
density function of certificate revocation requests. They choose an expo-
nential distribution function because it adequately approximates the data
they collected from a single CA. Based on this assumption, they provide
an economic model based on which a CA can choose what they state to be
the optimal CRL release interval. However, they do not take into account
the self-similar behavior of the revocation data.
6 Conclusions
Current simulation studies for performance evaluation and revocation
data release strategies most commonly assume that the temporal distri-
bution of revocation events follows a Poisson distribution. In this paper,
we questioned the assumption of Poisson distribution. Our analysis of
the revocation data contained in different CRLs provides significant ev-
idence that the real revocation events follow a self-similar distribution.
In particular, our analysis showed burstiness at all time-scales, confirm-
ing scale-invariance of distribution. We also estimated and showed that
Hurst parameter for the daily number of revoked certificates is above 0.5,
proving the self-similarity and Long Range Dependence formally.
We then turned our attention to understanding its consequences on
the performance of the revocation services. We showed that traditional
revocation mechanisms, such as CRLs or delta-CRLs, do not take into
account the bursty pattern of the revocation events when establishing the
issuing strategies. These bursts increase the maximum peak bandwidth
required to provide the revocation data timely. Thus, self-similarity has a
profound effect on the engineering of traditional mechanisms and should
be taking into account when designing new revocation protocols.
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Abstract. Certificate status validation is a hard problem in general
but it is particularly complex in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs)
because we require solutions to manage both the lack of fixed infras-
tructure inside the MANET and the possible absence of connectivity to
trusted authorities when the certification validation has to be performed.
In this sense, certificate acquisition is usually assumed as an initializa-
tion phase. However, certificate validation is a critical operation since
the node needs to check the validity of certificates in real-time, that is,
when a particular certificate is going to be used. In such MANET envi-
ronments, it may happen that the node is placed in a part of the network
that is disconnected from the source of status data at the moment the
status checking is required. Proposals in the literature suggest the use
of caching mechanisms so that the node itself or a neighbour node has
some status checking material (typically on-line status responses or lists
of revoked certificates). However, to the best of our knowledge the only
criterion to evaluate the cached (obsolete) material is the time. In this
paper, we analyse how to deploy a certificate status checking PKI ser-
vice for hybrid MANET and we propose a new criterion based on risk to
evaluate cached status data that is much more appropriate and absolute
than time because it takes into account the revocation process.
Keywords: Certification, Public Key Infrastructure, Revocation, Hy-
brid MANET, Risk.
1 Introduction
MANETs (Mobile Ad-hoc Networks) are cooperative networks that al-
low wireless nodes to establish spontaneous communications. As stated
in [1], such networks are envisioned to have dynamic, sometimes rapidly-
changing, random, multi-hop topologies which are likely composed of rel-
atively bandwidth constrained wireless links. MANETs may operate in
?? This work is funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Education under the
projects CONSOLIDER-ARES (CSD2007-00004), SECCONET (TSI2005-07293-
C02-01), ITACA (TSI2007-65393-C02-02), P2PSEC (TEC2008-06663-C03-01) and,
by the Government of Catalonia under grant 2005 SGR 01015 to consolidated re-
search groups.
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isolation (stand-alone), or they may have gateways to fixed networks. In
this last case, the MANET is called “hybrid”. Hybrid MANETs are ex-
pected to be deployed as an extension to the traditional infrastructure
networks. Also notice that the hybrid behaviour can be temporary due to
the situation in which an ad-hoc network may be sometimes stand-alone
and sometimes connected to the Internet e.g. a subway network in which
a MANET user is connected to the Internet while being at the station
and disconnected while traveling. The Hybrid MANET scenario is the
one considered in this paper.
On the other hand, trust and security are basic requirements to sup-
port business applications in this scenario. The public key scheme is the
preferred underlying mechanism to provide security services. In a public
key scheme, each participant has two keys: a public key (i.e. known by ev-
erybody) and a private key (i.e. secret). The announcement of the public
key is performed using a signed document called Public Key Certificate
(PKC) or simply “certificate“ that binds the participant with her public
key. The entity that signs the certificate is called “certificate issuer” or
“Certification Authority” (CA). In the literature, there are several ways
of managing security and trust in MANETs based on public key cryp-
tography. These approaches basically differ in the degree of decentraliza-
tion of the mechanisms deployed for issuing, publishing and revoking the
certificates (these approaches are reviewed in further detail in the next
section).
In decentralized architectures such as [2] and [3] the nodes inside
the ad-hoc network participate in the certification process. On the other
hand, in the centralized architecture the certification process is fully con-
trolled by an external CA that is a Trusted Third Party (TTP). In this
case the CA digitally signs certificates, ensuring that a particular pub-
lic key belongs to a certain user and the overall certification process is
performed according to a standard and publicly available policy. Each
scheme has its application scenario: decentralized approaches are suitable
for autonomous MANETs or hybrid MANETs that do not require a cen-
tralized enforced certification mechanism while the centralized approach
is suitable for hybrid MANETs in which inter-operability with currently
deployed centralized public key infrastructures (PKIs) is required.
The problem of using a centralized approach is that current PKIs are
designed for wired and well-connected networks, so adopting PKIs for
hybrid MANETs is not an easy task. Mobile users are expected to move
across different networks. When the user is in a network with connection
to the PKI, she can use all the PKI services such as get a certificate,
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launch a status query, etc. However, users may be disconnected from
the PKI when they require a real-time PKI service. In this sense, the
certificate status checking is a critical service because applications must
decide, at the time of usage, whether a certificate is acceptable or not to
perform an action. Proposals in the literature suggest the use of caching
mechanisms to let the node itself or a neighbour node to store status
checking material (typically on-line status responses or lists of revoked
certificates). However, to the best of our knowledge the only criterion
to evaluate the cached (obsolete) material is the time. In this paper we
propose and formulate a new criterion based on risk to evaluate cached
status checking data that is much more appropriate and absolute than
time because it takes into account the revocation process. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an analysis of the
main certification approaches for MANET. Section 3 discusses the main
issues that have to be solved in order to adapt current PKI status checking
mechanisms to MANET. In Section 4, we present our proposal to evaluate
cached status data and, finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 Certificate Management schemes for MANET
In general, certificate management schemes can be classified as:
– Decentralized. The nodes of the MANET participate either fully or
partially in the certification process (see Figure 1.b).
– Centralized. Authorities outside the MANET control the certification
process according to a global policy (see Figure 1.a).
In the fully decentralized PKI schemes for MANET, like Capkun et al.
[3, 4], the nodes of the MANET themselves issue, publish and revoke the
certificates. The certificate management is autonomous and self-organized
because there is no need for any trusted authority or fixed server and all
the nodes have the same role. In this system, like in PGP (Pretty Good
Privacy) [5], each user is her own issuer. Certificates are stored and dis-
tributed by the nodes in a fully self-organized manner. Each certificate is
issued with a limited validity period and it contains its issuing and expi-
ration times. Before a certificate expires, the owner can issue an updated
version of the certificate, which contains an extended expiration time.
Authors call this updated version the certificate update. Each node peri-
odically issues certificate updates, as long as the owner considers that the
user-key bindings contained in the certificate are correct. Trust is achieved
via chains of certificates. The nodes build trust paths certifying from one
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node to another, as in a friendship circle, forming an authentication ring
to achieve the trust relationships with other nodes of the MANET. A
decentralized trust management model for pervasive computing environ-
ments is presented in [6], where authors overcome the challenges posed by
dynamic open environments, making use of the autonomy and cooperative
behaviour of the entities.
Another group of public key schemes for MANET is based on thresh-
old cryptography [2]. The idea behind these schemes is to distribute certi-
fication duties amongst network nodes. A (k, n) threshold scheme allows
the signing private key to be split into n shares such that any k nodes
could combine and recover the signing key for a certain threshold k < n,
whereas k−1 or fewer nodes are unable to do so. In this manner, the sign-
ing key can be partitioned into n shares and distributed to n nodes using
the previous cryptographic technique. For instance, any k of n nodes could
then collaborate to sign and issue valid digital certificates or issue status
data; whereas a coalition of k− 1 or fewer nodes would not be able to do
so. Notice that this scheme is partially decentralized because it requires
an initialization phase in which a centralized authority assigns the role to
the n nodes that will act as servers for certificate management. Partially
decentralized schemes were first proposed by Zhou and Haas in [7]. This
work inspired a practical system called COCA [8] in which a threshold
cryptography scheme is implemented for infrastructure-based networks.
On the other hand, another system called MOCA [9] extends this idea to
ad-hoc networks. In this scheme security is improved by selecting powerful
nodes as Certificate Authority servers.
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Finally, an external public key infrastructure can also be used for the
hybrid scenario. In this case, centralized trusted authorities issue, pub-
lish and distribute the status (valid/revoked) of certificates according to
a well-defined standard methodology. In the Internet, the PKIX [10] is
the currently working public key infrastructure. However, PKIX is mostly
designed for wired and well-connected networks and adapting the PKIX
to the hybrid scenario is a challenging task because MANET nodes are
expected to move across different networks, sometimes with on-line con-
nection to the PKIX services and sometimes not. When the user is in
a network with connection to the PKI, she can use all the PKI services
such as getting a certificate, launching a status query, etc. However, users
may be disconnected from the PKIX when they require real-time PKIX
services. We discuss the problem of adapting PKI to MANET in more
detail in the next section.
3 Adapting PKIX to MANET
The local validity of the certificates in the decentralized approaches may
restrict their usability in the hybrid scenario. In this sense, the PKIX
approach is suitable for hybrid MANETs that require support for mobility
maintaining a centralized enforced certification mechanism and also inter-
operability with currently deployed PKIs. However, the original design of
the PKIX assumes that the user can access at any time to the entities
of the infrastructure which is true for wired well-connected networks but
not for our scenario.
The first problem that we have to face is the certificate acquisition.
A permanent connection of the client to the infrastructure cannot be
assumed so the solution is to choose relatively long validity periods for
the certificates. The idea is that the user has to pass an initial certification
process before she can start operating in the MANET. Once the user has
its credential, she can operate in the hybrid scenario without further
interaction with the PKI (at least interaction is not required for a quite
long time). This way of issuing the certificates can be assumed as an
initialization phase equivalent to the initialization phase of the partially
decentralized scheme in which the shares are delivered.
On the other hand, a certificate might be revoked (invalidated) prior to
its expiration. Among other causes, a certificate may be revoked because
of the loss or compromise of the associated private key, in response to
a change in the owner’s access rights, a change in the relationship with
the issuer or as a precaution against cryptanalysis. The revocation policies
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determine how the status of the certificates is distributed to the end users.
So the PKI is responsible for the certificates not only at the issuing time
but also during all the certificate’s life-time.
The problem is that PKIX explicit revocation systems were designed
for wired and well-connected networks in which repositories and respon-
ders have a well-known network address and are always available to users.
However, MANETs are dynamic environments in which network topol-
ogy changes randomly and in which mobile users continuously join and
leave the network. Therefore, new mechanisms are necessary to distribute
explicit status data in MANETs. Proposals in the literature suggest the
use of caching mechanisms to address these problems.
Caching schemes allow to manage arbitrary disconnections between
the users and the sources of the status data service. Disconnections are
alleviated by storing copies of status data (lists of revoked certificates
or on-line responses) in the nodes of the ad-hoc network. These copies
are obtained when connection to the infrastructure is available. In gen-
eral, an ad-hoc caching scheme for any service has four different kinds
of nodes [11]: server-nodes, client-nodes, caching-nodes and intermediate-
nodes (see Figure 2). For the status checking service:
– Server-nodes. These nodes have ”always updated data“ to offer the
status checking service. The server-node has a permanent connection
to the certification infrastructure in order to have always fresh status
information. Typically, a server-node is an Access Point connected to
both to a MANET and to the fixed network.
– Client-nodes. These nodes require the status checking service. A ser-
vice discovery mechanism has to be provided to the client so that she
can find a node in the network that provides the service.
– Caching-nodes. These nodes have cached data and therefore they may
also provide the status checking service. A client-node in the absence
of connectivity to a server-node or because of performance issues can
connect with a close caching-node to obtain the service with cached
status data (perhaps quite obsolete data).
– Intermediate-nodes. These nodes forward the packets among client
and server nodes. They may also store the path to a service provider
(whether a server-node or a caching-node) together with service pa-
rameters such as data size, the service expected Time-To-Live (TTL),
number of hops to reach the provider etc.
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In the literature we can find some proposals that apply the previous
ideas to adapt the PKI status checking standards CRL [12, 13] and OCSP
[14] to the MANET. A CRL is a black list with the identifiers of revoked
certificates. The integrity and authenticity of the CRL is provided by
an appended digital signature. On the other hand, OCSP is a protocol
to make the status of certificates available through a request/response
mechanism. The OCSP server is called responder and provides signed
responses to clients. Next, we give our point of view about this adaptation
and we briefly review some remarkable works about this in the literature.
In the case of CRL, server-nodes are nodes that can maintain a stable
connection to PKI repositories in order to get the most updated CRL.
A caching-node is a node that is willing to collaborate in the certificate
status checking service and that has enough cache capacity to store a CRL
copy. The caching-node responds to the status requests of client-nodes in
the MANET. Notice that a client-node that acquires a valid CRL copy
can become a new caching-node. Furthermore, a caching-node that moves
to another MANET can collaborate in the new network to provide the
service. In this sense, user’s mobility helps the status checking service. In
[15], the authors investigate the feasibility of using flooding to distribute
CRL information in MANETs by simulation. They conclude that the two
major factors for flooding to work smoothly are the number of nodes and
the communication range. In [16] a MANET cooperative mechanism for
certificate validation is presented in order to overcome both the lack of
infrastructure and the limited capabilities of the nodes. This solution is
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based on an extended-CRL where the repositories can build an efficient
structure through an authenticated hash tree.
Regarding OCSP, server-nodes are responders. We can consider that
there are only responders placed in the PKI (fixed-responders) or we can
consider the possibility of having responders implemented in a mobile
node that can be part of a MANET (mobile-responders). Despite this
possibility, we discourage the use of mobile-responders because they are
server-nodes and as such they are supposed to have updated status data.
A server-node for certificate status checking must have connectivity with
PKI repositories or fixed-responders to get updated status data but this
connectivity is not always guaranteed in a MANET. On the other hand, a
responder is a trusted authority so it has a private key that has to protect
against intruders. In our view, it makes no sense having a server-node that
is exposed to attacks and that may not have useful data. Furthermore, in
general, increasing the number of trusted authorities in a system is not
desirable, the less number of trusted authorities, the less is the probability
of having a private key compromised. Besides, if mobile-responders are
used, it is necessary to define a mechanism to trust them which is not
trivial. With respect caching-nodes, they store OCSP responses issued
by server-nodes and distribute them to client-nodes when they detect a
request that fulfils freshness requirements. In [17, 18], there is a complete
proposal called ADOPT (Ad-hoc Distributed OCSP for Trust) that de-
scribes a caching scheme for OCSP in MANET.
4 Evaluation of cached status data based on Risk
As explained in the previous section, caching and discovery mechanisms
are necessary to manage the situation in which a user is not able to reach
a PKI status data server. When a disconnection happens, the client-node
uses service discovery to find a caching node. Then, the node obtains a
cached version of available status data and finally, the node decides what
to do with the data. In this sense, the CA issues status data bounded by
two time-stamps:
– thisUpdate. Instant at which status data have been issued.
– nextUpdate. Instant at which updated status data are expected to be
issued.
Let us define Ts as the issuing interval of status data (1).
Ts = nextUpdate− thisUpdate (1)
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As data in status responses are time-stamped, users can get an idea
about how fresh is the status of a certificate by looking at the thisUpdate
parameter of the response and, finally a user can take a decision about
whether operate or not with a certain certificate. According to [19] the
time is the only criterion to help the user to take this decision and to the
best of our knowledge this is the only criterion proposed in the literature.
However, this is a poor criterion that can be enhanced. In this section,
we propose other parameter rather than time to take this decision.
First of all, let us illustrate why time is a poor parameter for our pur-
poses. For instance, consider a status response issued a couple of hours
ago. We may wonder: is it fresh or not? The answer is obviously that ”it
depends“. Two hours may not be considered a long time if there are a cou-
ple of revoked certificates every month but this period can be considered
quite long if there are two new revoked certificates per hour. Moreover,
a scenario with millions of issued non-expired certificates is not the same
as a scenario that has hundreds of certificates. In the former, a couple of
new revoked certificates is not so relevant while in the latter a couple of
new revocations is quite important. As a conclusion, we need a parameter
that considers all these aspects. For this purpose, we define a risk func-
tion that aids the user to decide whether to trust or not a certificate. We
formally define the function risk (r(t)) as the probability of considering a
certificate as a valid one when the real status known by the PKI is revoked
at time t.
To find an analytical expression for the risk function we first need
to analyse the certificate issuing process. Certificates are issued with a
validity period Tc. Obviously Tc >> Ts, for instance Tc can be a year
while the period of status data issuing can be an hour. The number of non-
expired certificates (N(t)) -including revoked and non revoked certificates-
is a stochastic process whose mean value at instant t depends on the
certificate issue and certificate expiration processes. It is assumed that the
elapsed time since issuing until expiration (Tc) is a constant value for all
certificates. Therefore, the expiration process is the same as the issuance
process elapsed Tc time units. This process is defined by the certificate
issue rate λc, which matches with the certificate expiration rate. Hence
the mean value of non-expired certificates in steady state is the mean
quantity of issued certificates before the expiration process begins.
E[N(t)] = N = λCTC , t > TC (2)
On the other hand, there is a group of revoked non-expired certificates,
that is to say, certificates that have a valid validity period but that have
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been revoked prior to the expiration date and, therefore they are included
in the black list. The subset of revoked non-expired certificates is included
in the set of non-expired certificates and the cardinality of that set, R(t),
is a stochastic process that it is typically modelled [20] as a fraction or
percentage (p(t)) of the non-expired certificates (3).
R(t) = p(t)N(t) with p(t) ≤ 1 (3)
Assuming that both processes are independent and using expected
values:
E[R(t)] = E[p(t)]E[N(t)] (4)
R = pN (5)
We further model the expected percentage of revoked certificates as
directly proportional to the certification time Tc (6).
p = p′Tc (6)
This means that larger certification periods will imply more percent-
age of revoked certificates. On the other hand, smaller certification periods
mean less probability of a certificate being revoked during its life-time and
therefore low percentage of revoked certificates. Then, the mean value of
the revoked non-expired certificates can be expressed as:
R = p′λcT 2c (7)
We have modelled the issuing and revoking processes of the overall
system. However, our goal is to model the risk from the point of view
of the user, that is to say, we want to find the probability of considering
a certificate as a valid one when the real status known by the PKI is
revoked.
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that at instant t0 = thisUpdate
a user gets the current black list of revoked certificates from the PKI. Us-
ing this list, the user can split the set of non-expired certificates into
revoked certificates and not revoked certificates.
Next, we need to define the subset of operative certificates as the
group of non-expired certificates for which the last status known by a
user is not revoked. Notice that the PKI may know that a certificate
considered operative by a user is in fact revoked. However, due to the
MANET conditions it is impossible to communicate this situation to the
user.
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Now, let us assume that the user is not able to connect to the infras-
tructure any more. As time goes by the set of operative certificates will
include revoked certificates and the user will need to take decisions about
using an operative certificate assuming a certain risk. The risk function
r(t) can be evaluated as the ratio between the number of unknown re-
voked operative certificates (R′(t)) and the number of operative certificates
(N ′(t)) as shown in equation (8).
r(t) =
E[R′(t)]
E[N ′(t)]
(8)
N ′(t) (number of operative certificates) can be defined as the number
of certificates that were not included in the last black list obtained by the
user (were not revoked before t0) and that they have not expired at t.
Included in the set of operative certificates there is the subset of unknown
revoked operative certificates. The cardinality of this subset R′(t) is the
number of operative certificates that are revoked at instant t, that is, they
are revoked but this fact is unknown to the user.
At t0 = thisUpdate the set of operative certificates is the same that the
set of not revoked certificates and, since the user has the same information
that the PKI so there is no risk (r(t0) = 0). Besides
E[N ′(t0)] = (1− p)N (9)
E[R′(t0)] = 0 (10)
At the instant t0+TC all the certificates included in the black list will
be expired. This means that all non expired certificates will be operative,
and any revoked certificate will be unknown to the user. The risk at this
moment can be expressed as (11).
r(t0 + TC) =
E[R′(t0 + TC)]
E[N ′(t0 + TC)]
=
E[R(t0)]
E[N(t0)]
= p (11)
To evaluate the function risk between t0 and t0+TC we have to observe
the processes N ′(t) and R′(t) in this interval. After t0 the variation of the
number of operative certificates (N ′(t)) depends on these factors:
– Increases because of the new issues.
– Decreases because of the expiration of operative certificates issued
before instant t0 (the certificates issued later do not expire in the
considered interval).
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The issuance rate is λc that is the same as the expiration rate. But
notice that not all expirations concern to operative certificates. A fraction
p of the expirations corresponds to revoked non expired certificates, and
the other fraction 1 − p corresponds to operative certificates. Then the
expiration rate of operative certificates is (1− p)λc (see Figure 3).
Fig. 3. Evolution of operative certificates
Considering the evolution of the set of operative certificates we can
evaluate its expected cardinal (12).
E[N ′(t)] = E[N ′(t0)] + λC(t− t0)− (1− p)λC(t− t0) (12)
Using (9) we obtain.
E[N ′(t)] = (1− p)N + pλC(t− t0) (13)
Finally, we need an expression for the set of revoked operative certifi-
cates. This set is the intersection of the set of operative certificates and
the set of revoked certificates as shown in the Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Sets of certificates
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Hence we can express the cardinality of these sets using the following
expression.
N(t) = R(t) +N ′(t)−R′(t) (14)
Therefore,
R′(t) = R(t) +N ′(t)−N(t) (15)
We obtain the expected value of the number of revoked operative
certificates using (15), (2), (5) and (13).
E[R′(t)] = pλC(t− t0) (16)
To obtain the risk function we use the expressions (13), (16) and the
expression of its definition (8).
r(t) =
p(t− t0)
(1− p)Tc + p(t− t0) (17)
The previous expression is valid for instants of time t  t0 ≤ t ≤
t0 + Tc and fulfils with the expected results of expressions (10) and (11).
Notice that the risk function allows a user to compute the probability of
considering a non-expired certificate as non-revoked when the real status
known by the PKI is revoked.
On the other hand, it is remarkable that unlike time which is a rela-
tive parameter, the risk function gives the user an absolute parameter to
aid her taking the decision of trusting or not a particular certificate. This
decision must be taken when the user is disconnected from the infrastruc-
ture and therefore it is taking into consideration cached (obsolete) status
data.
Finally, the risk function should be used as follows:
– In first place, the CA signs the status data with the two standard
time-stamps (thisUpdate and nextUpdate) but it also adds the current
parameter p. The CA can calculate this parameter because it knows
the current number of issued non-expired certificates and the current
number of non-expired revoked certificates.
– When the user has to evaluate status data, she knows Tc as this is the
certification period included in her certificate.
– Then, the user obtains p from the status data.
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– Next, the user can compute the risk at current time t by replacing t0
with thisUpdate in the risk function.
– Finally, the user can take a decision about a target certificate with
the risk value computed.
5 Conclusions
Decentralized certification architectures for MANET such as self-organized
PKIs and PKIs based on threshold cryptography generally provide certifi-
cate validation mechanisms inside the MANET. However, local validity
of the certificates and inter-operability with currently deployed PKIs may
restrict their usability in an hybrid MANET scenario. If a centralized cer-
tification infrastructure such as PKIX is used, then certificate validation
becomes one of the main problems. This is because users need to ensure at
the time of usage that the certificate they are relying upon has not been
revoked but at the same time trusted servers of PKIX may be unavail-
able. Besides, standard status checking mechanisms of the fixed network
are not directly usable because they are designed for always connected
users.
In this sense, caching schemes allow to manage arbitrary disconnec-
tions between the users and the sources of the status data service. Discon-
nections are alleviated by storing copies of status data (lists of revoked
certificates or on-line responses) in the nodes of the ad-hoc network. These
copies are obtained when connection to the infrastructure is available. On
the other hand, a service discovery mechanism is necessary to find the
nodes that have cached material. In this paper, we have reviewed and
analysed all these issues for adapting the standard PKIX status checking
mechanisms to hybrid MANET.
Despite the caching scheme allows the users to obtain status data dur-
ing disconnections, the cached status data is likely to be outdated. When
using cached status data a node could operate with a revoked certificate
considering it is a valid one. In this paper, we have presented a novel
scheme which provides users within the MANET with an absolute crite-
rion to determine whether to use or not a target certificate when updated
status data is not available. By taking into account information about the
revocation process, users can calculate a risk function in order to estimate
whether a certificate has been revoked while there is no connection to a
status checking server. Finally, it is also worth to mention that this new
criterion can be applied to other networks than hybrid MANETs if these
networks are based on an off-line explicit revocation scheme.
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Abbreviations
ADOPT Ad-hoc Distributed OCSP for Trust.
CA Certification Authority.
COCA Cornell On-line Certification Authority.
CRL Certificate Revocation List.
MANET Mobile Ad-hoc Network.
MOCA Mobile Certificate Authority.
OCSP On-line Certificate Status Protocol.
PGP Pretty Good Privacy.
PKI Public Key Infrastructure.
PKIX Public Key Infrastructure (X.509).
TTL Time-To-Live.
TTP Trusted Third Party.
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